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The financial assets that are subject to major EU financial legislation ( i.e. (designated types 
of) financial instruments) have traditionally been defined in a largely exemplary and circular 
manner. The recent proliferation of ‘non-traditional’ financial assets, such as cryptocurren- 
cies and stablecoins, is increasingly challenging the viability of these pragmatic financial 
asset definitions. Through the analysis of the technologies and functionalities underpin- 
ning non-traditional financial assets, legal scholarship has aimed to categorize novel assets 
within the existing framework of financial asset definitions. Although a solid understand- 
ing of e.g. distributed ledger applications and cryptography appears a prerequisite for future 
policy and legislative interventions, contemporary EU financial legislation is mostly indif- 
ferent to the technologies on which financial assets may be wired. Categorizations based on 
the purposes that non-traditional assets may serve ( i.e. payment, utility, and investment) are 
more relevant to financial law, but suffer from subjectivity because they depend on the asset 
usage by the asset holder. Against this backdrop, this paper proposes a novel systematiza- 
tion of non-traditional assets that is based upon the conceptual substructure of the assets 
within the scope of EU financial legislation. More specifically, this paper submits that, irre- 
spective of underlying technologies and functionalities, all assets that are subject to major 
EU financial legislation have a conceptual common denominator: they entail the liability of 
an entity and, hence, have intrinsic value. The proposed categorization singles out a well- 
defined group of novel financial assets that is not subject to EU financial law ( i.e. assets that 
only have extrinsic value). Different from functionality- and technology-based categoriza- 
tions, the suggested approach allows to eradicate some ambiguities that are present in the 
existing taxonomies. By exploring the conceptual common denominator of the financial 
assets that are subject to EU financial legislation, this paper aims to foster debate on the 
circular and exemplary character of financial asset definitions in EU financial legislation in 
general and the relation of these definitions to novel types of financial assets in particular. 
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. Introduction 
.1. Intrinsic and extrinsic asset value 
n line with common parlance and financial markets jargon,
his paper employs the term ‘asset’ to refer to any tangible 
r non-tangible item that has value ( e.g. gold or contractual 
ights).2 The value of an asset may be derived from determi- 
ants that are either intrinsic or extrinsic to the considered 
sset. 
The intrinsic determinants of asset value are the param- 
ters that define the very nature of an asset and from which 
he asset holder may directly or indirectly derive utility, even 
f there exists no market demand for the asset. For instance,
oybeans and gold may each provide direct utility to the asset 
older (respectively through e.g. food consumption and usage 
n smartphones), even if no one is willing to buy these assets 
rom the asset holder. Similarly, but indirectly, plain vanilla 
overnment bonds may provide utility to the bondholder, even 
n absence of prospective buyers in the bond market. Indeed,
 government bond entails the bondholder’s legally enforce- 
ble right to receive a predefined amount of funds from the 
overnment at the bond’s maturity. The received funds may 
n turn provide utility to the bondholder and, hence, a govern- 
ent bond has a certain intrinsic value. In the example of the 
overnment bond, the bondholder derives value from the con- 
ract through the bondholder’s right vis-à-vis the government 
nd the corresponding liability 3 of the government to perform 
is-à-vis the bondholder.4 Naturally, from the perspective of 
he issuing government, the contract cannot be regarded as 
n asset, since it has a negative net value for the government.
owever, in order not to compromise legibility and since right 
nd liability are in this context two sides of the same coin, I 
ill hereinafter refer to these types of contracts as ‘assets that 
ntail the liability of an entity’.5 
Besides intrinsic value, assets may also have extrinsic 
alue. The extrinsic determinants of asset value are param- 
ters that are exogenous to the asset, but nevertheless influ- 
nce asset value. In a market economy, extrinsic asset value 
ill result from the interaction between asset supply and de- 
and. Hence, extrinsic asset value does not only account for 
ntrinsic asset value, but also for e.g. the belief that others may 
t a future date want to acquire the asset at a favorable price.2 Hence, an item with no (intrinsic or extrinsic) value is not con- 
idered an asset. 
3 An obligation may also exist in absence of any entity deriving a 
ight from it. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, I will em- 
loy the term ‘liability’, which refers to the obligation of an entity 
owards another entity. This liability must not necessarily be a li- 
bility to deliver legal tender. It may e.g. also take the form of an 
bligation to refrain from action or to deliver services. 
4 See on the distinction between rights in personam and rights 
n rem : Peter Birks, ‘Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies’ (2000) 20 OJLS 
, 21. In some jurisdictions ( e.g. Belgium), a creditor is technically 
he owner of his claim vis-à-vis his counterparty. However, the fact 
hat a creditor has a right in rem on his claim does not alter the dis- 
inction between assets that have direct intrinsic value and assets 
hat derive their intrinsic value from a right in personam . 
5 The word choice in this paper thus takes the perspective of the 
sset holder. 
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or instance, with regard to a scarce tangible asset ( e.g. gold),
he law of supply and demand may result in a total asset value 
hat supersedes the intrinsic asset value. For assets that entail 
he liability of an entity ( e.g. government bonds), the distinc- 
ion between intrinsic and extrinsic value constitutes a fine 
ine. Intrinsic value is the value that one may derive from the 
sset as a subject ( i.e. the rights and liabilities that originate 
rom the asset itself), whereas extrinsic value is the value that 
ne may derive from the asset when it serves as the object (or
ingle leg) in a two-legged transaction. For example, the rights 
nd liabilities between a bondholder and the government that 
riginate from the mere existence of a government bond ( e.g.
ayment at maturity) contribute to the bond’s intrinsic value.
he degree to which the government—or any other entity—
grees or commits to accept government bonds in exchange 
or e.g. services, goods, or legal tender contributes to the bond’s 
xtrinsic asset value. 
In the gold example mentioned above, intrinsic and extrin- 
ic asset value partly overlap. However, assets may also have 
xtrinsic value in absence of any intrinsic value. The value of 
 bitcoin, for instance, is solely based on the law of supply and
emand (see more in detail infra no. 2.1). If there were no mar-
et demand for bitcoins, it would be impossible for the holder 
f the coin to derive any value from it. In this respect, bitcoins
undamentally differ from gold, soybeans, government bonds,
nd other assets with intrinsic value. 
.2. Thesis: assets that only have extrinsic value are not 
nancial instruments 
he financial assets that are subject to major EU financial leg- 
slation ( i.e. (designated types of) financial instruments) have 
raditionally been defined in a largely exemplary and circu- 
ar manner. The recent proliferation of ‘non-traditional’ finan- 
ial assets, such as cryptocurrencies and stablecoins, is in- 
reasingly challenging the viability of these pragmatic finan- 
ial asset definitions. Through the analysis of the technolo- 
ies and functionalities underpinning non-traditional finan- 
ial assets, legal scholarship has aimed to categorize novel 
ssets within the existing framework of financial asset defini- 
ions. Although a solid understanding of e.g. distributed ledger 
pplications and cryptography appears a prerequisite for fu- 
ure policy and legislative interventions, contemporary EU fi- 
ancial legislation is mostly indifferent to the technologies on 
hich financial assets may be wired. Categorizations based on 
he purposes that non-traditional assets may serve ( i.e. pay- 
ent, utility, and investment) are more relevant to financial 
aw, but suffer from subjectivity because they depend on the 
sset usage by the asset holder. Against this backdrop, this pa- 
er proposes a novel systematization of non-traditional assets 
hat is based upon the conceptual substructure of the assets 
ithin the scope of EU financial legislation. More specifically,
his paper submits that, irrespective of underlying technolo- 
ies and functionalities, all assets that are subject to major EU 
nancial legislation have a conceptual common denominator: 
hey entail the liability of an entity and, hence, have intrinsic 
alue. The proposed categorization singles out a well-defined 
roup of novel financial assets that is not subject to EU finan- 
ial law ( i.e. assets that only have extrinsic value). Different 
rom functionality- and technology-based categorizations, the 
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tocurrencies are (smart) contracts’ (2018) 34 CLSR 1144; Renato 
Mangano, ‘Blockchain Securities, Insolvency Law and the Sand- 
box Approach’ (2018) 19 EBOR 715; Alexander Snyers and Karl 
Pauwels, ‘ICOs in Belgium: down the rabbit hole into legal no 
man’s land? Part 1’ (2018) 29 ICCLR 483; Robby Houben, ‘Bitcoin: 
there are two sides to every coin’ (2015) TBH-RDC 139. Consider- 
ing the technology-insensitive character of EU financial law, this 
paper presents a different narrative. Therefore, this paper will not 
discuss technologies that may underpin novel financial assets. 
Interested readers may wish to consult the relevant online re- 
sources or the synopses of these primary sources that have been 
published elsewhere. See for primary sources e.g. Libra Associa- 
tion Members, ‘An Introduction to Libra’ (White Paper, last revised 
21 January 2020), available via https://libra.org/en-us/whitepaper ; 
Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash Sys- 
tem’ (2008), available via https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf, and the 
Bitcoin website ( https://bitcoin.org/en/ ). Cryptography has existed 
for thousands of years. See e.g. Donald. Davies, ‘A Brief History 
of Cryptography’ (1997) 2:2 Information Security Technical Re- 
port 14, 14. To render double spendin g virtually impossible, cryp- 
tography can be combined with a distributed ledger technol- 
ogy application. Cf . Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer 
Electronic Cash System’ (2008) 2, available via https://bitcoin.org/ 
bitcoin.pdf. Satoshi Nakamoto is most likely a pseudonym con- 
cealing the identity of one or more persons. The Bitcoin white pa- 
per was first released on Friday 31 October 2008 through the fol- 
lowing link http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/ 
2008-October/014810.html . 
7 See e.g. European Commission, ‘Consultation document suggested approach allows to eradicate some ambiguities that
are present in the existing taxonomies. By exploring the con-
ceptual common denominator of the financial assets that are
subject to EU financial legislation, this paper aims to foster de-
bate on the circular and exemplary character of financial asset
definitions in EU financial legislation in general and the rela-
tion of these definitions to novel types of financial assets in
particular. 
1.3. Relation to existing literature on financial asset 
categorization 
The systematization of non-traditional assets proposed in this
paper is no panacea for interpretational issues in relation to
the financial assets within the scope of EU financial legisla-
tion. That is to say, to conclude that a given asset is governed
by EU financial law, various parameters of the asset under
consideration have to be assessed in light of the criteria set
forth in the specific legislative act. The approach proposed
in this paper focusses on the conceptual properties that the
assets within the scope of EU financial law have in common
and, hence, only establishes a minimum threshold. Accord-
ingly, the observation that a certain asset entails the liability
of an entity and thus has intrinsic value is insufficient to con-
clude that the asset is governed by EU financial law. However,
the proposed categorization does shed light on an important
group of assets that is definitely not covered by EU financial
law: the assets that only have extrinsic value. As I will argue in
the remainder of this paper, this negative demarcation is par-
ticularly useful for determining the qualification under con-
temporary EU financial law of many non-traditional financial
assets, since many non-traditional financial assets only have
extrinsic value. 
The asset categorization proposed in this paper is comple-
mentary to the academic literature that has emerged in the
wake of the development of non-traditional financial assets.
In recent years, legal scholarship has extensively described
the functioning of cryptography and distributed ledger tech-
nology.6 Such technology-centered perspective is helpful for6 See e.g. Tycho De Graaf, ‘The Qualification of Bitcoins as Docu- 
mentary Intangibles’ (2019) 27 ERPL 1051; Simon Geiregat, ‘Cryp- gaining a deeper understanding of the technologies that may
underpin financial assets, but is not necessarily useful for
categorizing non-traditional assets within the existing frame-
work of financial asset definitions in EU financial law. This is
because the existing financial assets definitions in EU law are
largely indifferent to the technologies on which financial as-
sets may be wired. A second strand of literature has focused on
the functionalities of non-traditional assets. In these classifi-
cations, authors essentially draw a distinction between non-
traditional assets that are used for purposes of (i) payment;
(ii) utility; or (iii) investment.7 Although such functional divi-on an EU framework for markets in crypto-assets’ (Decem- 
ber 2019) 3, available via https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/ 
files/business _ economy _ euro/banking _ and _ finance/documents/ 
2019- crypto- assets- consultation- document _ en.pdf; FCA, ‘Guid- 
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t
ions are instructive and more helpful to financial law asset 
ualifications than technology-based taxonomies, they also 
uffer from drawbacks. First, non-traditional assets that have 
een conceived for one purpose ( e.g. payment) may very well 
e used for another purpose ( e.g. investment).8 Hence, in prac- 
ice, asset classifications based on asset usage will lead to sub- 
ective and hybrid asset qualifications. The asset value catego- 
ization that is suggested in this paper, on the other hand, pro- 
ides an objective criterion that excludes a well-defined group 
f assets from the scope of application of EU financial law ( i.e.
ssets that do not entail the liability of an entity and thus only 
ave extrinsic value). Secondly, and more importantly, asset 
ategorizations based upon asset functionalities do not (aim 
o) identify a common denominator that is inherent to all as- 
ets within scope of EU financial legislation. None of the men- 
ioned asset functions (payment, utility, and investment) ap- 
ears to be a prerequisite for the application of EU financial 
aw. Consequently, it is not immediately clear how the identifi- 
ation of asset functionality could lead to determinative state- 
ents about the scope of applications of EU financial law. For 
nstance, not all the assets that fall under the application of 
U financial law have an investment functionality. 
.4. Contents 
he remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, I 
ropose a conceptual categorization of non-traditional assets 
ased on whether these assets entail the liability of an entity 
nd thus have intrinsic value (no. 2).9 The proposed system- 
tization aims to offer a supplementary narrative to the cur- 
ently prevailing technology- and functionality-focused clas- 
ifications of non-traditional financial assets. For illustrative 
urposes, I will apply the value-based asset categorization 
o the ten non-traditional assets that have the largest mar- 
et capitalization, as listed on the major data repository for 
rypto-assets. In the second part of this paper, I aim to demon- 
trate that the financial instrument notion as employed in EU 
nancial law restricts the application of EU financial law to fi- 
ancial assets that entail the liability of an entity and thus 
ave intrinsic value (no. 3). In line with this thesis, I argue 
hat non-traditional financial assets that only have extrinsic 
alue are not covered by EU financial law and briefly explore 
he policy implications of this finding. In no. 4, I tentatively 
xplore whether the central thesis of this paper may also be nce on Cryptoassets’ (Consultation Paper CP19/3, January 2019) 
, available via https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/ 
p19-03.pdf; Philipp Maume and Mathias Fromberger, ‘Regulation 
f Initial Coin Offerings: Reconciling U.S. and E.U. Securities Laws’ 
2019) 19 Chic. J. Int. Law 548, 558 et seq.; Marlinde Nannings, 
Kwalificatie van crypto-assets als effect’ (2019) TFR 623, 623 
t seq.; Philipp Hacker and Chris Thomale, ‘Crypto-Securities 
egulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU 
inancial Law’ (2018) 15 ECFR 645, 649 et seq.; Alexander Snyers 
nd Karl Pauwels, ‘ICOs in Belgium: down the rabbit hole into 
egal no man’s land? Part 1’ (2018) 29 ICCLR 483, 488 et seq. 
8 Cf. e.g. Alexander Snyers and Karl Pauwels, ‘ICOs in Belgium: 
own the rabbit hole into legal no man’s land? Part 1’ (2018) 29 
CCLR 483, 498. 
9 Given the conceptual approach employed in this paper, pecu- 
iarities related to national law shall not be covered. 
n
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f importance to the analysis of non-traditional assets under 
he different legal conceptualizations of ‘money’. Finally, I will 
onclude in no. 5. 
. Recently developed types of financial 
ssets 
.1. Novel financial assets that have intrinsic value 
quities, securitized debt instruments, and derivatives are ex- 
mples of ‘traditional’ financial assets. As I aim to demon- 
trate infra in no. 3, these assets entail the liability of an entity.
quity instruments, for instance, may entail the liability of a 
ompany vis-à-vis its shareholder to distribute profits or liq- 
idation proceeds. In recent years, financial markets have wit- 
essed the development of novel types of assets that equally 
ntail the liability of an entity. These novel assets may em- 
loy cryptography and/or distributed ledger applications ( e.g.
lockchain) to facilitate (disintermediated) transferability and 
ecurity. Nevertheless, this type of novel assets mimics tradi- 
ional financial assets in that they also derive intrinsic value 
rom the legally enforceable contractual rights that they be- 
tow upon the asset holder.10 
If the relevant liability is being created for the purpose of 
nancing the issuing entity’s business activities, the process 
hrough which the novel type of financial asset is conceived 
s often referred to as an initial coin or token offering (ICO or
TO).11 However, it should be stressed that the terminology at 
and is not standardized and, hence, different authors and 
olicymakers may attribute different meanings to the refer- 
nced terms. Some authors may, for instance, reserve the term 
coin’ to refer to assets that have been conceived for payment 
pplication purposes. Similarly, some commentators may un- 
erstand the notion ‘token’ to also capture assets that do not 
erely aim to serve as an alternative to traditional fund rais- 
ng channels.12 Most importantly, the terms ICO and ITO do 
ot necessarily imply the establishment of a right for the as- 
et holder vis-à-vis an issuing entity.13 Indeed, the concepts 
re in practice often used to describe the genesis of financial 
ssets that do not entail the liability of an entity (see infra no.
.3). 
Instead of financing (risky) business activities, funds raised 
hrough the creation of liability-representing assets may alter- 
atively be invested in low-risk assets. Such usage of the accu- 
ulated funds will stabilize the value of the issued assets, re- 
ardless of the technologies that may underpin them. By back- 10 Typically, a non-traditional asset that entails an entity’s liabil- 
ty is created in exchange for a payment by the (prospective) asset 
older. 
11 See e.g. Alexander Snyers and Karl Pauwels, ‘ICOs in Belgium: 
own the rabbit hole into legal no man’s land? Part 1’ (2018) 29 
CCLR 483. 
12 See e.g. Skander Bennis, ‘Consumentenbescherming bij 
lockchain en smart contracts’ in Reinhard Steennot and 
ert Straetmans (eds), Digitalisering van het recht en con- 
umentenbescherming (Intersentia 2019) 235, 258 (footnote 137). 
13 Cf . the description of the term ‘ICO’ in Ryan Coffey v. Ripple 
abs Inc., et al., 333 F.Supp.3d 952 (Dist. Court, ND California 2018), 
t 955. 
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ing the conceived assets with a stable pool of low yield assets
( e.g. bank deposits or liquid short term government bonds) 14 or
assuring the stable value of the assets through other means,15
the protagonists of this new type of assets aim to offer an al-
ternative to existing currencies.16 Since the publication of the
Libra White Paper in June 2019,17 this type of assets has grav-
itated towards the center of political and public attention.18 
These assets are commonly referred to as stablecoins, but also
in this context there is no generally accepted definition. Al-
though stablecoins are deliberately designed to maintain their
intrinsic value and thus shield the asset holder from risk ex-
posure,19 they resemble, for our purposes, assets that are cre-
ated with a view to funding business activities. That is to say,
regardless of the purposes for which funds are collected, the
conceived financial assets entail the liability of an entity. For
stablecoins, the liability of the issuing entity vis-à-vis the as-
set holder will typically consist of an obligation to redeem the
assets at issuance price. This redemption may either occur
through direct interaction between the issuer and the asset
holder or, as is the case with Libra,20 via a network of dealers,
to whom the issuer will in turn be liable for redemption.21 14 See e.g. Christian Catalini, Oliver Gratry, J. Mark Hou, Sunita 
Parasuraman, Nils Wernerfelt, ‘The Libra Reserve’ (paper con- 
tributed to the Libra Association, last revised 14 August 2019), 
available via https://libra.org/en- US/about- currency- reserve/ 
#the _ reserve . 
15 See for other stabilizing mechanisms: G7 Working Group on 
Stablecoins, ‘Investigating the impact of global stablecoins’ (G7 
Report, October 2019), 24, available via https://www.bis.org/cpmi/ 
publ/d187.pdf
16 See e.g. Libra Association Members, ‘An Introduction to Libra’ 
(White Paper, last revised 21 January 2020), available via https:// 
libra.org/en-us/whitepaper . 
17 Libra Association Members, ‘An Introduction to Libra’ (White 
Paper, last revised 21 January 2020), available via https://libra.org/ 
en-us/whitepaper . Since its launch in June 2019 and after severe 
regulatory pushback, several of the founding members have left 
the Libra Association. See e.g. Hannah Murphy and Kiran Stacey, 
‘Penny drops for Facebook’s payments partners: Zuckerberg em- 
pire hit as regulatory fears on Libra currency trigger exodus’ Fi- 
nancial Times (London, 16 October 2019) 17. 
18 See e.g. Denis Beau, ‘Stablecoins – a good or a bad solution to 
improve our payment systems?’ (Stablecoin Conference "Which 
ambitions for Europe?", Paris, 15 January 2020), available via https: 
//www.bis.org/review/r200115c.htm ; G7 Working Group on Stable- 
coins, ‘Investigating the impact of global stablecoins’ (G7 Report, 
October 2019), available via https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d187. 
pdf; Yves Mersch, ‘Money and private currencies – reflections on 
Libra’ (ESCB Legal Conference, Frankfurt am Main, 2 September 
2019), available via https://www.bis.org/review/r190902a.htm . 
19 Libra Association Members, ‘An Introduction to Libra’ (White 
Paper, last revised 21 January 2020), 3, available via https://libra. 
org/en-us/whitepaper . 
20 Christian Catalini, Oliver Gratry, J. Mark Hou, Sunita Parasur- 
aman, Nils Wernerfelt, ‘The Libra Reserve’ (paper contributed to 
the Libra Association, last revised 14 August 2019), 2, available via 
https://libra.org/en- US/about- currency- reserve/#the _ reserve . 
21 In the case of Libra, the Libra Association is the issuing entity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Novel financial assets that only have extrinsic value 
2.2.1. Conceptual 
In recent years, financial markets have also witnessed the de-
velopment of a second novel type of financial assets. Critically
different from the assets discussed in no. 2.1, this second type
of assets does not entail the liability of any entity. Just like
novel asset types that have intrinsic value, these assets may be
wired on cryptography and/or distributed ledger applications.
However, for the assets discussed in this paragraph, there is no
entity that has committed itself to an obligation of any kind
vis-à-vis the asset holder. In this respect, these assets resem-
ble assets such as gold and soybeans, which equally do not
derive their value from the representation of the liability of an
entity. Naturally, the similarity does not go beyond this point,
since commodity-like assets have intrinsic value, whereas the
assets described in this paragraph do not. Prominent exam-
ples of novel financial assets that do not entail the liability of
an entity are Bitcoin and Litecoin, but as I aim to demonstrate
in no. 2.3, many of the non-traditional assets with large mar-
ket capitalizations fit within this category. 
Much like any other type of financial asset, bitcoins and
litecoins are being purchased by investors, who thus attach
value to these assets. However, unlike many traditional finan-
cial assets, bitcoins and litecoins exclusively derive their value
from the interaction between supply and demand.22 In this
context, market demand expresses the degree to which mar-
ket participants are willing to transfer e.g. goods, services, or
euros in exchange for bitcoins or litecoins (see supra no. 1.1).23
If there were no market demand for bitcoins or litecoins, it
would be impossible for the coin holder to derive any value
from it.24 
One strand in legal scholarship has suggested that bit-
coins may derive their value from the reciprocal obligation for
bitcoin-users to accept payment in bitcoins.25 In my view, this
notion is incorrect.26 First, in the EU, no entity is obliged to ac-22 Market forces will of course account for factors such as secu- 
rity, transferability, and avoidance of double spending. However, 
this does not change the fact that any asset value for the asset 
holder is contingent on outside buying interest in the asset. See 
also Adrian D. Lee, Mengling Li, and Huanhuan Zheng, ‘Bitcoin: 
Speculative asset or innovative technology?’ (2020) 67 J. Int. Financ. 
Markets Inst. Money, forthcoming. 
23 Vice versa, the willingness of a bitcoin or litecoin holder to 
transfer his bitcoins or litecoins in exchange for goods, services, 
euros, dollars, etc. constitutes the market supply for the relevant 
asset. 
24 The fact that the value of this type of assets is solely deter- 
mined through the continuous but turbulent interaction between 
supply and demand may be one of the reasons why these assets 
have in the past been subject to strong price volatility. 
25 See Simon Geiregat, ‘Eigendom op bitcoins’ (2018) 81 RW 
1043, 1047. Cf . Simon Geiregat, ‘Cryptocurrencies are (smart) con- 
tracts’ (2018) 34 CLSR 1144, 1146. See, however, Simon Geire- 
gat, ‘Cryptovaluta’s in het vermogensrecht: Poging tot gemeen- 
en consumentenrechtelijke kwalificatie’ in Mark Delanote and 
Patrick Waeterinckx (eds), C ryptomunten juridisch ontsloten (Inter- 
sentia 2020) 15, 20. 
26 See more in detail: Evariest Callens and Liselotte Van Coil- 
lie, ‘Cryptomunten in het financieel recht: geen regulering 
in afwezigheid van enige aanspraak jegens een aanwijsbare 
6 computer law & security review 40 (2021) 105494 
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no intrinsic value.
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs’ (6 February 
2018) 101, 101, available via https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ 
pkg/CHRG- 115shrg28854/pdf/CHRG- 115shrg28854.pdf. See 
also CFTC, ‘An Introduction to Virtual Currency ’ , available 
via https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/ 
@customerprotection/documents/file/oceo _ aivc0218.pdf. Cf . 
CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F.Supp.3d 213 (Dist. Court, ED New York 
2018), at 218. 
30 EBA, ‘EBA Opinion on virtual currencies’ (EBA/Op/2014/08, 
4 July 2014) 11 (no. 19), available via https://eba.europa. 
eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/657547/ 
81409b94- 4222- 45d7- ba3b- 7deb5863ab57/EBA- Op- 2014- 08% 
20Opinion%20on%20Virtual%20Currencies.pdf?retry=1 , in which 
the EBA stated that a virtual currency is a “digital represen- 
tation of value that is neither issued by a central bank or public 
authority nor necessarily attached to a [conventional fiat cur- 
rency], but is used by natural or legal persons as a means of 
exchange and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically .”. 
Cf . ESMA, EBA, and EIOPA, ‘ESMA, EBA and EIOPA warn con- 
sumers on the risks of Virtual Currencies’, 1, available via 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50- 
164-1284_joint_esas_warning_on_virtual_currenciesl.pdf: “[vir- 
tual currencies are] a digital representation of value that is neither 
issued nor guaranteed by a central bank or public authority and 
does not have the legal status of currency or money.” See also the 
description advanced by a group of IMF staff: “[virtual curren- 
cies] are digital representations of value, issued by private developers 
and denominated in their own unit of accoun t” and “[ t ] he con- 
cept of [virtual currencies] covers a wider array of “currencies,”
ranging from simple IOUs of issuers (such as Internet or mobile 
coupons and airline miles), [virtual currencies] backed by assets 
such as gold, and “cryptocurrencies” such as Bitcoin .” Dong He et ept a payment in bitcoins, unless such obligation has been 
ontractually agreed upon (see infra no. 4). In any case, the ex- 
stence of such obligation cannot be deducted from the mere 
act that a person is e.g. holding bitcoins or has used these 
oins in the past. Secondly, and more importantly, whether en- 
ities accept payments in bitcoins or have an obligation to do 
o ( quod non ) does not determine the value of these bitcoins.
s explained above, the value or purchase power of bitcoins 
s determined by the degree to which market participants are 
illing to transfer goods, services, euros, dollars, etc. in ex- 
hange for bitcoins. Bitcoin thus derives external asset value 
rom the purchase power that entities are willing to provide in 
xchange for bitcoins, not from the mere obligation to accept 
itcoins. 
.2.2. Virtual currencies, digital currencies, cryptocurrencies,
nd crypto-assets 
he novel assets that I have thus far described in no. 2.2 as 
aving only extrinsic value may in more technology-sensitive 
ategorizations e.g. be labeled virtual currencies, digital cur- 
encies, cryptocurrencies, or crypto-assets. Once more, how- 
ver, the terminology at hand is not standardized and, hence,
ifferent commentators may understand these terms to mean 
ifferent things. More importantly, these concepts do not draw 
 clear division between assets that entail the liability of an 
ntity and assets that only have extrinsic value. 
The term ‘virtual currency’ has been defined by the EU leg- 
slator in the anti-money laundering directives as “a digital rep- 
esentation of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a central 
ank or a public authority, is not necessarily attached to a legally 
stablished currency and does not possess a legal status of currency 
r money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of 
xchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded electron- 
cally ”.27 This definition reflects quite adequately what inter- 
ational policymakers generally understand to be virtual cur- 
encies. The European Central Bank (ECB), for instance, has 
efined a virtual currency as “a digital representation of value,
ot issued by a central bank, credit institution or e-money institu- 
ion, which, in some circumstances, can be used as an alternative to 
oney .”28 Similarly, on the other side of the Atlantic, the US 
ommodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has defined 
 virtual currency as “[…] a digital representation of value that 
ay function as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a 
tore of value [and is] generally run on a decentralized peer-to-peer 
etwork .”29 Comparable descriptions or definitions have been rechts)persoon?’ in Mark Delanote and Patrick Waeterinckx (eds), 
 ryptomunten juridisch ontsloten (Intersentia 2020) 39-71. 
27 Art. 3(18) Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament 
nd of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use 
f the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
errorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the 
uropean Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 
005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
ommission Directive 2006/70/EC (text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 
41, 5 June 2015, 73. 
28 ECB, ‘Virtual currency schemes – a further analysis’ (February 
015) 25, available via https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ 
irtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf. 
29 J. Christopher Giancarlo, ‘Written Statement of J. C. Gi- 
ncarlo, Chairman of the CFTC, Before the US Senate Com- 
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ormulated by the European Securities and Markets Authority 
ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European 
nsurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and 
he staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).30 All these 
olicy descriptions of virtual currencies do not define virtual 
urrencies in terms of intrinsic or extrinsic asset value. 
Similarly, the term ‘digital currency’ does not clearly differ- 
ntiate between assets that derive their intrinsic value from a 
iability towards the asset holder and assets that only have 
xtrinsic value. According to the Committee on Payments and 
arket Infrastructures (CPMI) from the Bank for International 
ettlements (BIS), digital currencies may include money is- 
ued by a central bank.31 In earlier work, however, the CPMI 
ad stated that “in most cases, […] digital currencies are assets 
ith their value determined by supply and demand ”, which have 
32 l ., ‘Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations’ (IMF 
taff Discussion Note 2016/03, January 2016) 7, available via 
ttps://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf. 
31 Work from the CPMI shows that central banks have in re- 
ent years examined the potential of digital currencies to serve 
s a new form of digital central bank money. See CPMI, ‘Cen- 
ral bank digital currencies’ (March 2018), available via https:// 
ww.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf. Cf . also Christian Barontini and 
enry Holden, ‘Proceeding with caution – a survey on central 
ank digital currency ’ (BIS Papers no. 101, January 2019), available 
ia https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap101.pdf. Critics, on the 
ther hand, claim that the recent attention from central banks for 
igital currencies has not been genuine. See e.g. Martin Arnold, 
Central bankers’ talk of launching digital currencies is all bluff’ 
inancial Times (London, 5 December 2019) 14. 
32 CPMI, ‘Digital currencies’ (November 2015) 4, available via 
ttps://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf. 
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Fig. 2 – The ten assets listed on CMC with the largest 
market capitalization (11 February 2020).168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, also the term cryptocurrency does not allow to draw
a bright line between assets that represent the liability of an
entity and assets that only have extrinsic value. There is cur-
rently no generally accepted cryptocurrency definition.33 Al-
though the term is typically associated with assets that are
similar to Bitcoin, there are no reasons to assume that cryp-
tographic assets that represent the liability of an entity may
not be covered by the term. Indeed, conceptually, a ‘currency’
may refer to any representation of value that aims to serve a
monetary function,34 and, hence, the notion is not necessar-
ily limited to assets that only have extrinsic value. Similarly,
the concept of crypto-assets is equivocal in this respect, since
assets that are underpinned by cryptography may or may not
entail the liability of an entity.35 
Much of the ambiguity surrounding the terminology cur-
rently used by the industry can be traced back to the
technology- or functionality-sensitive character of the terms
that have been employed. The resulting proliferation of defini-
tions, interpretations, and descriptions hampers mutual un-
derstanding.36 Furthermore, a categorization inspired upon
the used technology bears little relation to the technology-
insensitive asset definitions employed in EU financial legis-
lation (see infra no. 3). 
2.3. Asset value categorization of the non-traditional 
financial assets with the largest market capitalization 
At the time of writing, the market capitalization of Bitcoin
equaled $185.4 billion.37 The other 5108 cryptographic and
distributed ledger applications displayed on CoinMarketCap
(CMC)—sometimes referred to as ‘altcoins’—had a combined
market value of $107.9 billion,38 bringing the total market33 For an overview of the descriptions formulated by the var- 
ious relevant international policy makers, see Robby Houben 
and Alexander Snyers, ‘Cryptocurrencies and blockchain: Le- 
gal context and implications for financial crime, money laun- 
dering and tax evasion’ (study requested by the "TAX3" com- 
mittee of the European Parliament, July 2018) 20-23, avail- 
able via http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3% 
20Study%20on%20cryptocurrencies%20and%20blockchain.pdf. 
34 See Lexico by Oxford University Press , https://www.lexico.com/en/ 
definition/currency , which describes a ‘currency’ as “[a] system of 
money in general use in a particular country ”, or more broadly “[ t ] he 
fact or quality of being generally accepted or in use ”. 
35 Differently: ECB Crypto-Assets Task Force, ‘Crypto-Assets: Im- 
plications for financial stability, monetary policy, and payments 
and market infrastructures’ (ECB Occasional Paper Series no. 223, 
May 2019) 3 and 7, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/ 
pdf/scpops/ecb.op223 ∼3ce14e986c.en.pdf. 
36 Cf . ECB Crypto-Assets Task Force, ‘Crypto-Assets: Implications 
for financial stability, monetary policy, and payments and mar- 
ket infrastructures’ (ECB Occasional Paper Series no. 223, May 
2019) 7, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ 
ecb.op223 ∼3ce14e986c.en.pdf. 
37 https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/ , consulted on 
11 February 2020. 
38 CMC refers to all the applications listed on its website as ‘cryp- 
tocurrencies’. However, many of the applications show little re- 
semblance to currencies ( e.g. Ethereum). If the application oper- 
ates independently, CMC calls it a ‘coin’. If the application cannot 
function independently ( e.g. because it uses a coin’s blockchain), 
CMC refers to it as a ‘token’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
value of all reported applications to $293.3 billion.39 For com-
parison, this combined market capitalization roughly equals
the market capitalization of a single large multinational com-
pany ( e.g. the market cap of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufac-
turing Co. Ltd. is $304.3 billion) 40 or a fraction of the market
capitalization of the US company with the largest market cap-
italization (the market cap of Apple Inc. is $1398 billion).41 
2.3.1. Non-traditional assets that only have extrinsic value 
The ten assets listed on CMC that have the largest market cap-
italization contain a subset of assets that resemble Bitcoin in
that they only have extrinsic value (Ether, Ripple, Bitcoin Cash,
Bitcoin SV, EOS, Litecoin, Binance Coin, and Tez). Some of these
assets strongly resemble Bitcoin in their functionalities (Bit-
coin Cash, Bitcoin SV, and Litecoin) and will therefore not be
discussed in detail in this paper.42 In the following paragraphs,
I discuss why Ether, Ripple, EOS, Binance Coin, and Tez only
have extrinsic value. 
Binance coin: Binance Coin is an asset that has been issued
by one of the largest crypto-exchanges in the world ( i.e. the
Binance Exchange) and runs on the Ethereum blockchain.43 
The Binance Whitepaper stipulates that the Binance Exchange
accepts binance coins as payment for any fees related to the39 Ibid . Although alternative data repositories exist ( e.g. https: 
//onchainfx.com/ ), CMC is by far the most dominant provider of 
market data in the crypto sphere. It is my understanding that CMC 
provides the most comprehensive overview of the market. For an 
overview of non-traditional financial assets that have failed, see 
https://deadcoins.com/ . 
40 See https://ycharts.com/companies/TSM , consulted on 11 
February 2020. 
41 https://ycharts.com/companies/AAPL/market _ cap , consulted 
on 11 February 2020. 
42 Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin SV have directly originated from Bit- 
coin and aim to offer more scalable alternatives to Bitcoin. Bitcoin 
was split (‘forked’) into Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Cash 
was in turn split into Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin SV. Litecoin also 
strongly resembles Bitcoin’s functionalities, despite the many dif- 
ferences in the technologies underpinning both assets ( e.g. the al- 
gorithms in the mining process). See https://litecoin.org/ . 
43 See Binance Exchange, ‘Binance Whitepaper v.1.2’, 
available via https://www.binance.com/resources/ico/ 
Binance _ WhitePaper _ en.pdf. 
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50 https://ripple.com/ . Unlike other non-traditional financial as- 
sets, Ripple is not mined. All 100 billion XRP have existed since 
the development of Ripple in 2013. Ripple Labs Inc. and the devel- 
opers of Ripple still hold large portions of these coins and periodi- 
cally sell parts of their reserves to other entities. See Ryan Coffey v. ervices provided by the platform.44 Nevertheless, the mere 
act that an entity has contractually agreed to accept a cer- 
ain type of asset ( e.g. binance coins, gold, or soybeans) in ex- 
hange for a predefined set of services does not mean that the 
esignated asset entails a liability or has intrinsic value. Criti- 
ally different from assets that entail the liability of an entity,
ny value that a coin holder may derive from binance coins 
resupposes the existence of a liability vis-à-vis the Binance 
xchange.45 In other words, the Binance Exchange is obliged 
o accept binance coins as a payment if services are delivered,
ut no obligation to deliver services arises from a binance coin.
ence, the liability to accept a payment in binance coins is ex- 
genous to the coin and, consequently, binance coins as such 
o not have intrinsic value. Instead, the contractual commit- 
ent to accept binance coins as a means of payment is merely 
n expression of the market demand for binance coins ( i.e. the 
egree to which market participants are willing to exchange 
ervices, goods, legal tender, etc. for binance coins). This mar- 
et demand contributes to the extrinsic asset value of binance 
oins. 
Ether, Ripple, and Tez: Ethereum is a blockchain-based plat- 
orm that offers the code and software for the design of a wide 
ariety of decentralized applications, which can all be built 
pon the Ethereum blockchain.46 Ether, on the other hand, is 
he asset that the developers of applications can (and must) 
se to pay the fees charged by miners for the processing of 
thereum transactions ( e.g. for the execution of smart con- 
racts).47 As with binance coins, ethers do not entail the lia- 
ility of an entity vis-à-vis the asset holder.48 Naturally, the 
act that ethers may be exchanged for e.g. services in relation 
o smart contracts gives ethers a substantial external value. 
Ripple Labs Inc. is a company that has developed a dis- 
ributed ledger that aims to facilitate rapid and cheap cross- 
order payments with real-time settlement between financial 
nstitutions.49 Ripple (XRP) is the asset (sometimes called the 
central currency’) that entities can use to execute the cross- 44 Binance Exchange, ‘Binance Whitepaper v.1.2’, available via 
ttps://www.binance.com/resources/ico/Binance _ WhitePaper _ 
n.pdf. 
45 Indeed, the right to pay in binance coins ( e.g. for a delivered 
ervice) is conceptually different from the right to receive a service 
rom the Binance Exchange. 
46 Vitalik Buterin, ‘A Next Generation Smart Contract & 
ecentralized Application Platform’ (Ethereum White Pa- 
er), available via https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0dbb/ 
a54ca5066b82fa086bbf5db4c54b947719a.pdf? _ ga=2.175027233. 
030949799.1581617651-192866814.1581617651 . 
47 Vitalik Buterin, ‘A Next Generation Smart Contract & De- 
entralized Application Platform’ (Ethereum White Paper) 13 
nd 30, available via https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0dbb/ 
a54ca5066b82fa086bbf5db4c54b947719a.pdf? _ ga=2.175027233. 
030949799.1581617651-192866814.1581617651 . 
48 In October 2019, CFTC Chairman Heath P. Tarbert stated pub- 
icly that the CFTC considers Ether to qualify as a commodity 
nder US law. See CFTC, ‘Chairman Tarbert Comments on Cryp- 
ocurrency Regulation at Yahoo! Finance All Markets Summit’ 
Press Release, 10 October 2019), available via https://www.cftc. 
ov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8051-19 . 
49 https://ripple.com/ . 
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order payments via the distributed ledger.50 It is my under- 
tanding that Ripple does not entail the liability of Ripple Labs 
nc. or any other entity vis-à-vis the asset holder. In the US,
lass actions have been brought against Ripple Labs Inc. for 
lleged violations of US securities laws.51 Thus far, there is no 
ecision that has determined that Ripple constitutes a secu- 
ity within the meaning of the US Securities Act of 1933.52 In 
ny case, the interpretation of the US securities notion does 
ot easily translate to the European context (see infra no. 3.2.3).
Tezos is a self-amending decentralized ledger that, simi- 
arly to Ethereum, has been developed to allow entities to con- 
true smart contracts.53 Tez is the asset that allows entities to 
ay for services related to the distributed ledger.54 To my un- 
erstanding and similar to the other assets discussed in this 
ection, Tez does equally not represent the liability of an en- 
ity. 
EOS: the Cayman Islands-incorporated company named 
block.one’ has developed software (‘EOSIO’) that can func- 
ion as an operating system for one or more EOSIO-based 
lockchains.55 Comparably to other decentralized ledgers dis- 
ussed above, EOSIO-based blockchains are decentralized sys- 
ems that aim to facilitate the construal of decentralized ap- 
lications.56 Fundamentally different from the blockchains 
iscussed above ( e.g. Ethereum), cryptographic tokens issued 
n relation to EOSIO-based blockchains are not needed to pay 
ransaction fees. Instead, the cryptographic tokens related to 
n EOSIO-based blockchain express the degree to which the 
older can use the resources of the blockchain ( i.e. essentially 
andwidth, storage, and computational power).57 In other ipple Labs Inc., et al., 333 F.Supp.3d 952 (Dist. Court, ND California 
018), at 954 and 955. 
51 See Vladi Zakinov, et al., v. Ripple Labs, Inc., et al., 369 
.Supp.3d 950 (Dist. Court, ND California 2019); Avner Green- 
ald v. Ripple Labs, Inc., et al., Case no. 18-cv-04790-PJH (Dist. 
ourt, ND California 2018); Ryan Coffey v. Ripple Labs Inc., 
t al., 333 F.Supp.3d 952 (Dist. Court, ND California 2018). 
ee also https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand. 
34410/gov.uscourts.cand.334410.70.0.pdf The District Court has 
ot answered the question whether Ripple constitutes a security. 
52 Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
53 L.M Goodman, ‘Tezos — a self-amending crypto-ledger’ (White 
aper, 2 September 2014), available via https://tezos.com/static/ 
hite _ paper-2dc8c02267a8fb86bd67a108199441bf.pdf. 
54 L.M Goodman, ‘Tezos — a self-amending crypto-ledger’ (White 
aper, 2 September 2014), available via https://tezos.com/static/ 
hite _ paper-2dc8c02267a8fb86bd67a108199441bf.pdf. 
55 SEC, ‘Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings in the 
atter of Block.one’ (Administrative Proceeding File no. 3-19568, 
0 September 2019), at 2. 
56 block.one, ‘EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2’ (16 March 
018), available via https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/ 
lob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper.md ; Ian Grigg, ‘EOS – An In- 
roduction’ (EOS White Paper, 5 July 2017), available via https: 
/whitepaperdatabase.com/eos-whitepaper/ . 
57 block.one, ‘EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2’ (16 March 
018), available via https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/ 
lob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper.md . 
computer law & security review 40 (2021) 105494 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
words, the holder of ten percent of the tokens may use (or
rent-out) ten percent of the blockchain’s resources.58 This sys-
tem is known in the industry as the ‘ownership model’.59 The
resources of the blockchain are provided by so-called ‘block
producers’ (BPs). These are entities that are being selected
through a continuous election process in which the entities
holding the cryptographic tokens linked to the blockchain cast
votes. Anyone can solicit votes to be elected as a BP and the
BPs are rewarded through the creation of additional tokens ( i.e.
an inflation-like reward system). 
According to the US Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), ‘block.one’ has sold 900 million of the 1 billion
created ‘ERC-20 Tokens’ ( i.e. tokens distributed via the rele-
vant Ethereum smart contract or ‘EOS Tokens’),60 retaining
100 million ‘founder tokens’. The token purchasers paid $4 bil-
lion to block.one for the acquisition of these digital assets.61
A substantial amount, considering that the relevant ‘token
purchase agreement’ stipulated in no uncertain terms that
none of the assets would grant the asset holder any rights,
uses, purposes, functionalities etc.62 The ERC-20 Tokens were
not even tokens that could potentially be used on any fu-
ture EOSIO-based blockchain.63 Instead, the publicly available
and freely adaptable standard version of the EOSIO-software
merely determined that the holders of ERC-20 Tokens were
to receive other cryptocraphic tokens for use on EOSIO-based
blockchains in proportion to the relative amount of ERC-20 To-
kens that they held. However, the agreement also determined
that block.one would not develop any EOSIO-based blockchain
and that any EOSIO-based blockchain would thus have to be
developed by a third party.64 Even if a third party were to de-58 block.one, ‘EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2’ (16 March 
2018), available via https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/ 
blob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper.md . 
59 Cf. e.g. https://blockgeeks.com/guides/eos-blockchain/ . 
60 SEC, ‘Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings in the 
Matter of Block.one’ (Administrative Proceeding File no. 3-19568, 
30 September 2019), at 2; SEC, ‘SEC Orders Blockchain Com- 
pany to Pay $24 Million Penalty for Unregistered ICO’ (SEC Press 
Release, 30 September 2019), available via https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press-release/2019-202 . 
61 See e.g. Kate Rooney, ‘A blockchain start-up just 
raised $4 billion without a live product’ CNBC (31 May 
2018), available via https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/31/ 
a-blockchain-start-up-just-raised-4-billion-without-a-live-product. 
html . Payment occurred in Ether. At the time of the acquisition, 
the market value of the ethers used to finance the purchase of 
the ERC-20 Tokens was equivalent to $4 billion. 
62 EOS Token Purchase Agreement (Last updated: 4 Septem- 
ber 2017), available via https://d340lr3764rrcr.cloudfront. 
net/purchase _ agreement/block.one+-+EOS+Token+Purchase+ 
Agreement+-+September+4%2C+2017.pdf. 
63 EOS Token Purchase Agreement (Last updated: 4 Septem- 
ber 2017), available via https://d340lr3764rrcr.cloudfront. 
net/purchase _ agreement/block.one+-+EOS+Token+Purchase+ 
Agreement+-+September+4%2C+2017.pdf. Cf . SEC, ‘Order Insti- 
tuting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings in the Matter of Block.one’ 
(Administrative Proceeding File no. 3-19568, 30 September 2019), 
at 3 (no. 7). 
64 EOS Token Purchase Agreement (Last updated: 4 Septem- 
ber 2017), available via https://d340lr3764rrcr.cloudfront. 
net/purchase _ agreement/block.one+-+EOS+Token+Purchase+ 
Agreement+-+September+4%2C+2017.pdf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cide to develop an EOSIO-based blockchain, there exited no
guarantee that developers would distribute the tokens for the
EOSIO-based blockchain in proportion to the holdings of the
relevant ERC-20 Tokens. Although the first developed EOSIO-
based blockchain (the ‘EOS Blockchain’) did indeed distribute
the EOSIO-blockchain tokens (called ‘EOS’ or ‘EOS Tokens’) ac-
cording to the volume of the relevant ERC-20 Tokens that mar-
ket participants had acquired, more recent initiatives have de-
viated from, or intend to deviate from, the division of powers
determined by the ERC-20 Tokens distribution.65 
The SEC has argued that the ERC-20 Tokens qualify as se-
curities under US law and, hence, that block.one has violated
its obligation under US law to obtain registration with the
SEC for selling these tokens. However, the SEC has agreed to
settle with block.one in exchange for the payment of a civil
money penalty of $24 million.66 In any case, the ERC-20 to-
kens that were sold by block.one do not entail the liability of
block.one or any other entity. To the extent that a blockchain
uses (an unamended version of) the EOSIO-software ( e.g. the
EOS blockchain), the software will only allow the holder of
the relevant cryptographic tokens to use his or her propor-
tional part of the blockchain resources.67 To my understand-
ing, the holder of a cryptographic token linked to an EOSIO-
based blockchain ( e.g. ‘EOS’) has no right vis-à-vis a BP or a
central entity. BPs may decide to stop providing services at any
time. Naturally, by establishing a right to use the resources of
the blockchain (if any), cryptographic tokens linked to EOSIO-
based blockchains may obtain a significant extrinsic value. 
2.3.2. Non-traditional assets that have intrinsic value 
In my view, only one asset within the CMC’s top ten of non-
traditional assets with the largest market capitalization en-
tials the liability of an entity: Tether. So-called ‘tethers’ are
cryptographic tokens that are “backed in a one -to -one ratio […]
by the corresponding fiat currency unit held in deposit by Hong Kong
based Tether Limited .”68 Verified entities holding tethers may re-
deem their coins with a central custodian ( i.e. Tether Limited)
in exchange for bitcoins or the fiat currency underlying the
tethers ( i.e. US dollars, euros, or offshore Chinese yuan).69 A
tether thus represents the liability of Tether Limited vis-à-vis
the tether holder to redeem the coin for the reserve assets held65 See e.g. Brady Dale, ‘Everyone’s Worst Fears About EOS Are Prov- 
ing True’ (19 September 2019), available via https://www.coindesk. 
com/everyones-worst-fears-about-eos-are-proving-true . 
66 SEC, ‘Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings in the 
Matter of Block.one’ (Administrative Proceeding File no. 3-19568, 
30 September 2019), at 6; SEC, ‘SEC Orders Blockchain Com- 
pany to Pay $24 Million Penalty for Unregistered ICO’ (SEC Press 
Release, 30 September 2019), available via https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press-release/2019-202 . 
67 block.one, ‘EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2’ (16 March 
2018), available via https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/ 
blob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper.md . 
68 Tether, ‘Tether: Fiat currencies on the Bitcoin blockchain’ 
(White Paper, June 2016), at 4, available via https://tether.to/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/TetherWhitePaper.pdf. 
69 Tether, ‘Tether: Fiat currencies on the Bitcoin blockchain’ 
(White Paper, June 2016), at 4, available via https://tether.to/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/TetherWhitePaper.pdf; Tether, 
‘Tether Limited Terms of Service’ (last updated 26 February 2019), 
at no. 3, available via https://tether.to/legal/ . 
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y Tether Limited.70 Although the protagonists of Tether aim 
o provide users with the functionalities of so-called stable- 
oins (see supra no. 2.1), inter alia by guaranteeing that the bal- 
nce of reserve fiat currencies will remain equal to (or greater 
han) the number of tethers in circulation,71 it appears that 
ether Limited might have defrauded its investors and that 
ether is (no longer) backed by sufficient reserves to allow full 
edemption for all investors.72 Naturally, this does not change 
he fact that tethers entail the liability of Tether Limited. 
. Assets that only have extrinsic value are 
ot financial instruments 
.1. EU financial law governs assets that entail liabilities 
U financial legislation employs multiple anchor points to de- 
ermine its scope of application. In many legislative acts, a 
ivotal determinant pertains to the properties of the financial 
ssets that are e.g. being offered, traded, advised, cleared, or 
ettled. For instance, the prospectus obligation in the Prospec- 
us Regulation only applies to certain securities,73 the clearing 
bligation in the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation 
EMIR) only applies to certain classes of OTC derivatives,74 and 
ll rules in the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) only apply to 
ertain financial instruments.75 These examples merely pro- 
ide a flavor of the wide variety of financial assets that may 70 Tether, ‘Tether Limited Terms of Service’ (last updated 26 
ebruary 2019), at no. 3, available via https://tether.to/legal/ . 
71 Tether, ‘Tether: Fiat currencies on the Bitcoin blockchain’ 
White Paper, June 2016), at 4, available via https://tether.to/ 
p-content/uploads/2016/06/TetherWhitePaper.pdf. 
72 In the Matter of the Inquiry by Letitia James, Attor- 
ey General of the State of New York v. iFinex Inc. et al., 
ocket no. 450545/2019 (Supreme Court, New York County), 
ll 126 documents in relation to the case are available 
ia https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/nyscef/DocumentList? 
ocketId=npvulMdOYzFDYIAomW _ PLUS _ elw=&&display= 
ll&;courtType=New%20York%20County%20Supreme% 
0Court&resultsPageNum=1 ; New York State Attorney General, 
Attorney General James Announces Court Order Against “Crypto”
urrency Company Under Investigation For Fraud’ (Press Release, 
5 April 2019), available via https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/ 
ttorney- general- james- announces- court- order- against- crypto- 
urrency-company ; Michael Patterson and Eric Lam, ‘Cryp- 
ocurrencies Lose $10 Billion on Tether Cover-Up Allega- 
ions’ (Bloomberg, 26 April 2019), available via https://www. 
loomberg.com/news/articles/2019- 04- 26/cryptocurrencies- lose- 
0- billion- on- tether- cover- up- allegations . 
73 Art. 1(1) Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament 
nd of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus to be pub- 
ished when securities are offered to the public or admitted to 
rading on a regulated market, and repealing Directive 2003/71/EC 
text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 168, 30 June 2017, p. 12 (Prospectus 
egulation). 
74 Art. 4(1) Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parlia- 
ent and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central 
ounterparties and trade repositories (text with EEA relevancy), OJ 
 201 27 July 2012, p. 1 (EMIR). 
75 Art. 2(1) Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parlia- 
ent and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (mar- 
et abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the Eu- 
opean Parliament and of the Council and Commission Direc- 
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e used by the legislator to determine the scope of applica- 
ion of different EU directives and regulations in the field of 
nancial law. Furthermore, additional requirements will typi- 
ally have to be fulfilled in order for a certain financial asset to
e covered by the scope of a legislative act. With regard to the
rospectus obligation, for instance, it is only the subset of se- 
urities that are offered to the public or admitted to trading on 
 regulated market situated or operating within a EU member 
tate for which a prospectus must be published.76 
The central thesis of this paper maintains that the large 
ajority, if not all, financial assets subject to EU financial leg- 
slation have at least one characteristic in common: they en- 
ail an entity’s liability. A comprehensive verification of this 
roposition would require the assessment of all rules pre- 
cribed in EU financial legislation. In light of the impracticality 
f such study, I will only be able to provide narrative evidence,
hich I will construe around the financial instrument notion 
s defined in the second markets in financial instruments di- 
ective (MiFID II).77 To my understanding, MiFID’s financial in- 
trument notion is one of the broadest EU conceptions of fi- 
ancial assets. This financial instrument notion has also been 
eferenced by many other EU legislative acts in the sphere of 
nancial markets. Furthermore, for the purposes of this pa- 
er, non-MiFID definitions of financial instruments strongly 
esemble the MiFID notion. 
.2. Financial instruments 
.2.1. Relevancy of the concept 
inancial instruments as defined in MiFID II: MiFID II contains nu- 
erous rules that attach their scope of application to the ‘fi- 
ancial instrument’ notion. For example, the conduct of busi- 
ess rules that investment firms have to observe in dealings 
ith their clients only relate to financial instruments (arts. 24–
0 MiFID II).78 Other pieces of EU financial legislation reference 
he financial instrument concept as defined in MiFID II when 
efining the scope of certain rules. This is, for instance, the 
ase in the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (Mi- ives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC (text with EEA rel- 
vancy), OJ L 173, 12 June 2014, p. 1 (MAR). 
76 Art. 1(1) Prospectus Regulation. 
77 ‘Financial instrument’ is defined in art. 4(1)(15) juncto Annex I, 
art C, to Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of 
he Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments 
nd amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (re- 
ast) (text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 173 12 June 2014, p. 349 (MiFID 
I). MiFID II is the successor to Directive 2004/39/EC of the Euro- 
ean Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets 
n financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC 
nd 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament 
nd of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L 
45, 30 April 2004, p. 1 (MiFID I). I use ‘MiFID’ to refer to MiFID I and 
I together. MiFID I contained a similar definition of the financial 
nstrument notion (see art. 4(1)(17) juncto Annex I, Part C MiFID I). 
78 The relevant provisions either directly limit their scope of ap- 
lication to financial instruments or refer to notions that have 
een defined in relation to financial instruments ( e.g. ‘investment 
dvice’ (art. 4(1)(4) MiFID II) and ‘investment services and activi- 
ies’ (art. 4(1)(2) MiFID II)). 
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FIR),79 which, among other things, imposes a reporting obliga-
tion on investment firms for transactions in financial instru-
ments (art. 26 MiFIR). Similarly, all rules embedded in the MAR
only apply to (certain) financial instruments, as defined in Mi-
FID II.80 , 81 
Other EU financial legislation refers to specific types of
the financial instruments defined in MiFID II. For instance,
the Prospectus Regulation only requires the publication of a
prospectus for securities that are offered to the public or ad-
mitted to trading on a regulated market situated or operat-
ing within the EU.82 The term securities, as employed in the
Prospectus Regulation, refers to the term ‘transferable securi-
ties’ as defined in MiFID II (art. 2(a) Prospectus Regulation).83 
As will be described in more detail infra (no. 3.2.3), transferable
securities are one of the subtypes of financial instruments. 
MiFID II provides an exhaustive list of instruments that
qualify as financial instruments within the meaning of the
Directive.84 The following elements have been designated as
financial instruments: (i) transferable securities; (ii) money
market instruments; (iii) units in collective investment under-
takings; (iv) certain derivatives ; 85 and (v) certain emission al-
lowances.86 The formally exhaustive nature of the list does79 See art. 2(1)(9) Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Par- 
liament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (text with 
EEA relevancy), OJ L 173, 12 June 2014, p. 84 (MiFIR), which refers to 
the financial instrument notion as defined in MiFID II. 
80 See supra no. 3.1. See also art. 3(1) MAR, which refers to MiFID 
II for the interpretation of the financial instruments notion. 
81 The alternative investment fund managers directive (AIFMD) 
also defines ‘financial instrument’ by reference to MiFID II. See art. 
4(1)(n) Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regula- 
tions (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (text with EEA rel- 
evancy), OJ L 174, 1 July 2011, p. 1 (AIFMD). However, the financial 
instrument notion is not used to determine the scope of AIFMD 
rules. 
82 Art. 1(1) Prospectus Regulation. The former Prospectus Direc- 
tive also imposed this obligation. See art. 1(1) Directive 2003/71/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 
2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are of- 
fered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC (text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 345 31 December 2003, 
p. 64 (Prospectus Directive). On 21 July 2019, the majority of the 
Prospectus Directive’s provisions were replaced by the Prospectus 
Regulation (see art. 46 juncto art . 49 Prospectus Regulation). 
83 More specifically, the definition of ‘securities’ in the Prospec- 
tus Regulation refers to the MiFID II ‘transferable securities’ notion 
and excludes money market instruments (as defined in MiFID II) 
with a maturity of less than twelve months. The latter component 
of the definition is somewhat odd, as under MiFID II money market 
instruments do by definition not qualify as transferable securities 
because they are traded on the money market and not on the cap- 
ital market. 
84 See Annex I, Part C, MiFID II. 
85 MiFID II defines ‘derivatives’ in a peculiar way. Art. 4(1)(49) Mi- 
FID II defines derivatives by reference to art. 2(1)(29) MiFIR. How- 
ever, art. 2(1)(29) MiFIR in turn refers back to MiFID II. More pre- 
cisely, MiFIR states that derivatives are the financial instruments 
that are (i) defined in art. 4(1)(44)(c) MiFID II; and (ii) listed in Annex 
I, Section C, (4) to (10) MiFID II. 
86 More specifically, Annex I, Part C, MiFID II contains the fol- 
lowing list of financial instruments: " (1) Transferable securities; (2) not mean that the financial instrument notion has been de
facto exhaustively defined. Some of the listed financial instru-
ments are themselves defined open-ended, which means that
the financial instrument concept is not as exhaustively de-
fined as one may initially suspect. 
Financial instruments as defined in other EU legislation: Besides
the EU legislative acts that literally reference MiFID II for the
interpretation of the financial instruments notion, there ex-
ists also legislation that establishes an independent defini-
tion of financial instruments. For instance, the Financial Col-
lateral Directive (FCD), which was adopted in 2002 and thus
preceded the adoption of MiFID I, provides a standalone def-
inition of financial instruments.87 This definition strongly re-
sembles the MiFID II definition in that it essentially covers—
in MiFID-terminology—transferable securities, units in col-
lective investment undertakings, and money market instru-
ments. More recent additions to the MiFID notion of financial
instruments ( e.g. emission allowances) 88 are not covered by
the FCD-definition. In any case, the arguments that are devel-
oped below in the context of the MiFID II financial instrument
definition equally apply to the definition in the FCD. Money-market instruments; (3) Units in collective investment undertak- 
ings; (4) Options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any other 
derivative contracts relating to securities, currencies, interest rates or 
yields, emission allowances or other derivatives instruments, financial 
indices or financial measures which may be settled physically or in cash; 
(5) Options, futures, swaps, forwards and any other derivative contracts 
relating to commodities that must be settled in cash or may be settled in 
cash at the option of one of the parties other than by reason of default 
or other termination event; (6) Options, futures, swaps, and any other 
derivative contract relating to commodities that can be physically set- 
tled provided that they are traded on a regulated market, a MTF, or an 
OTF, except for wholesale energy products traded on an OTF that must be 
physically settled; (7) Options, futures, swaps, forwards and any other 
derivative contracts relating to commodities, that can be physically set- 
tled not otherwise mentioned in point 6 of this Section and not being for 
commercial purposes, which have the characteristics of other derivative 
financial instruments; (8) Derivative instruments for the transfer of credit 
risk; (9) Financial contracts for differences; (10) Options, futures, swaps, 
forward rate agreements and any other derivative contracts relating to cli- 
matic variables, freight rates or inflation rates or other official economic 
statistics that must be settled in cash or may be settled in cash at the 
option of one of the parties other than by reason of default or other ter- 
mination event, as well as any other derivative contracts relating to as- 
sets, rights, obligations, indices and measures not otherwise mentioned 
in this Section, which have the characteristics of other derivative finan- 
cial instruments, having regard to whether, inter alia, they are traded on 
a regulated market, OTF, or an MTF; (11) Emission allowances consisting 
of any units recognised for compliance with the requirements of Directive 
2003/87/EC (Emissions Trading Scheme).”
87 Art. 2(1)(e) Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements, 
OJ L 168, 27 June 2002, p. 43 (FCD). 
88 Emission allowances were only included in the list of financial 
instruments after the adoption of MiFID II. 
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94 See the description under (c) in the illustrations listed in 
art. 4(1)(44) MiFID II ( supra footnote 92): “(c) any other securities 
giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securi- 
ties or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by reference to 
transferable securities, currencies, interest rates or yields, com- 
modities or other indices or measures [own emphasis].” The 
fact that the notion transferable securities captures 
derivatives has been confirmed by the European Com- 
mission: European Commission, ‘Q&As on MiFID’, 39, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/markets-financial-instruments- 
mifid-directive-2004-39-ec/implementation/guidance- 
implementation-and-interpretation-law_en: “[forwards on 
securities] may be either transferable securities according to Arti- 
cle 4(1)(18) [MiFID I] or other derivative contracts according to Section 
C(4) of Annex I [MiFID I]”. More fundamentally, the fact that 
derivatives can qualify as derivatives also follows from MiFID’s 
definition of derivatives (see supra footnote 85), which references 
a part of the MiFID-definition of transferable securities. Cf . also 
Philipp Maume and Mathias Fromberger, ‘Regulation of Initial 
Coin Offerings: Reconciling U.S. and E.U. Securities Laws’ (2019) .2.2. Instruments 
rior to examining the different types of financial instru- 
ents, it may be worthwhile to first consider the meaning 
f the umbrella term financial instruments . In common par- 
ance, an instrument refers to a ‘tool’, a ‘means of pursuing an 
im’, or a ‘legal document’.89 When used in relation to finan- 
ial assets, I am tempted to think that the word refers to the 
eans that make an investment possible. To my understand- 
ng, means of investment have to be distinguished from the 
ctual object of investment. In other words, gold, real estate,
nd soybeans may serve as investments, but they do not qual- 
fy as (investment) instruments. On the other hand, shares of 
 gold exchange traded fund (ETF), bonds issued by a real es- 
ate company, and futures on soybeans may all be called in- 
estment instruments. These instruments give expression to 
 specific and predefined contractual liability of an entity vis- 
-vis the instrument holder. 
.2.3. Transferable securities 
iFID II: Transferable securities form a major subtype of Mi- 
ID’s financial instruments notion. MiFID II defines ‘transfer- 
ble securities’ as " those classes of securities which are negotiable 
n the capital market, with the exception of instruments of pay- 
ent ".90 This means that in order to qualify as a transferable 
ecurity, an asset must meet the following conditions: 
1) the asset has to be a security; 
2) the security has to be negotiable; 
3) the negotiation must occur on the capital market; 
4) the security negotiable on the capital market must not be 
an instrument of payment. 
The definition continues by illustratively listing,91 among 
ther things,92 shares, bonds, and—maybe surprisingly 93 —89 Lexico by Oxford University Press, https://www.lexico.com/ 
efinition/instrument . 
90 Art. 4(1)(44) MiFID II. 
91 The illustrative character of the list follows from the usage of 
he words " such as" . 
92 The complete list of examples includes the following assets: 
shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in com- 
anies, partnerships or other entities, and depositary receipts in respect 
f shares; (b) bonds or other forms of securitised debt, including deposi- 
ary receipts in respect of such securities; (c) any other securities giving 
he right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities or giving rise 
o a cash settlement determined by reference to transferable securities, 
urrencies, interest rates or yields, commodities or other indices or mea- 
ures ”. See art. 4(1)(44) MiFID II. 
93 The inclusion of derivatives within the concept of transferable 
ecurities implies that derivatives are securities. The notion that 
erivatives are securities is opposed to a more conservative un- 
erstanding of the securities concept. Such restrictive interpreta- 
ion only includes equity and securitized debt instruments ( i.e. in 
ssence (instruments similar to) shares and bonds) in the securi- 
ies concept. This is the meaning typically attributed to ‘securities’ 
n financial markets jargon. 
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erivatives 94 as transferable securities.95 Given its exemplary 
ature, this list does not, in my view, have a restrictive effect 
n the instruments that could potentially be brought under 
he transferable security notion.96 The criteria referenced in 
he definition also mean that the mentioned illustrations do 
ot unconditionally qualify as transferable securities. For in- 
tance, shares that are not negotiable on the capital market 
ill not qualify as transferable securities.97 
As can be seen from the first criterion, the transferable se- 
urities definition is largely circular. Although the definition 
heds some light on the interpretation of the adjective ‘trans- 
erable’, the meaning of the notion ‘security’ remains unde- 
ned. In other EU legislative acts, the notion ‘security’ equally 
emains undefined.98 Nevertheless, the illustrations of trans- 
erable securities that are mentioned in the MiFID II definition 
re assets that entail a certain liability of an entity vis-à-vis 
he asset holder.99 For example, shares entail a company’s lia- 
ility vis-à-vis a shareholder, bonds entail an issuer’s liability 9 Chic. J. Int. Law 548, 583-584 (“a forward contract on oranges 
ould also be a transferable security ”); Philipp Hacker and Chris 
homale, ‘Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and 
ryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law’ (2018) 15 ECFR 645, 670 
“[a] typical example of the last category are stock options ”). 
95 Art. 4(1)(44) MiFID II. 
96 Cf . European Commission, ‘Q&As on 
iFID’, 22, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/ 
arkets- financial- instruments- mifid- directive- 2004- 39- ec/ 
mplementation/guidance- implementation- and- interpretation- law _ 
n . Differently: Philipp Hacker and Chris Thomale, ‘Crypto- 
ecurities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies 
nder EU Financial Law’ (2018) 15 ECFR 645, 670. 
97 European Commission, ‘Q&As on Mi- 
ID’, 9 and 22, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/ 
arkets- financial- instruments- mifid- directive- 2004- 39- ec/ 
mplementation/guidance- implementation- and- interpretation- law _ 
n . 
98 To the best of my knowledge, there is also no decision from the 
uropean Court of Justice (ECJ) that defines the security notion. 
f . Philipp Maume and Mathias Fromberger, ‘Regulation of Initial 
oin Offerings: Reconciling U.S. and E.U. Securities Laws’ (2019) 19 
hic. J. Int. Law 548, 573-574; Marlinde Nannings, ‘Kwalificatie van 
rypto-assets als effect’ (2019) TFR 623, 625. 
99 See supra footnote 92 for the complete list of mentioned exam- 
les. 
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necessarily follows that securities cannot be traded on a market 
other than the capital market and that the capital market notion 
does not in itself impose any additional conditions on the concept vis-à-vis a bondholder, and derivatives entail the contingent
liabilities of the counterparties to the contract (or the liabil-
ity of the party that is out of the money vis-à-vis the party
that is in the money, if changes in the parameter or event
underlying the derivative contract have already materialized).
The legislative illustrations provide an indication of the type
of financial assets that the EU legislator envisioned with the
transferable securities notion, but do not limit the scope of
the notion ( supra ). However, the fact that transferable securi-
ties are financial instruments means, in my view, that direct in-
vestments in the ‘object of investment’ cannot be covered by
the term. Albeit direct investments are obviously investments,
they cannot be catalogued as instruments or means for in-
vestment.100 For illustrative purposes, a far-fetched example
may underscore this distinction: the public offering of assets
that represent the liability of a soybean farm may require a
prospectus, but the public offering of a sufficiently large batch
of soybeans by the same soybean farm does not. Indeed, al-
though soybeans and assets entailing the liability of a soybean
farm both have intrinsic value, only the latter may qualify as
a financial instrument (transferable security). 
The other three criteria embedded in the transferable secu-
rities notion are less pivotal for the purposes of this paper.101
First, the negotiability of a security implies tradability ( e.g. on a
multilateral platform),102 but assets that do not entail the lia-
bility of an entity may equally be tradeable. Secondly, the fact
that the securities have to be negotiable on the capital mar-
ket appears to impose little, if any, restrictive conditions on
the type of assets that may be included in the transferable se-
curities notion.103 Thirdly, for our purposes, the exclusion of00 See more in detail supra 3.2.2. 
01 Although these criteria must of course be assessed in order 
to determine whether a certain financial asset may qualify as a 
transferable security, the central thesis of this paper ( i.e. assets 
that do not represent the liability of an entity cannot be financial 
instruments) does not depend on them. See also supra no. 1.2. 
02 European Commission, ‘Q&As on Mi- 
FID’, 22, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/ 
markets- financial- instruments- mifid- directive- 2004- 39- ec/ 
implementation/guidance- implementation- and- interpretation- law _ 
en . Assets that are not tradeable, for instance because they are 
subject to contractual restrictions on transfer, cannot qualify as 
transferable securities. 
03 MiFID II does not define the notion ‘capital market’. There is 
also no consensus in legal scholarship on the exact interpreta- 
tion of the concept. See e.g. Rüdiger Veil, ‘Concept and Aims of 
Capital Markets Regulation’ in Rüdiger Veil (ed), European Capital 
Markets Law (Hart Publishing 2017) 23, 23-24. Since it concerns an 
undefined concept to which no restrictive conditions appear to be 
connected, it may be assumed that this is a broader concept than 
the defined concept ‘trading venue’. Trading venues include all 
regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities, and organized 
trading facilities (art. 4(1)(24) MiFID II). This view is supported 
by the Q&A from the European Commission regarding MiFID 
I. This document attributes a particularly broad interpretation 
to the capital market concept by stating the following: "[the 
notion of capital market] is meant to include all contexts where 
buying and selling interest in securities meet." See European Com- 
mission, ‘Q&As on MiFID’, 1 and 22, https://ec.europa.eu/info/ 
law/markets- financial- instruments- mifid- directive- 2004- 39- ec/ 
implementation/guidance- implementation- and- interpretation- law _ 
en . If this description of the capital market notion is accepted, it 
1
1
1
1
1
1
instruments of payment from the transferable securities no-
tions merely reaffirms that transferable securities are instru-
ments.104 
Other EU legislation: Just as with the umbrella term finan-
cial instruments (see supra no. 3.1), not all EU financial leg-
islation refers to MiFID II for the interpretation of the trans-
ferable securities notion. The Undertakings for Collective In-
vestment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive, for in-
stance, employs a standalone definition of transferable secu-
rities.105 Much like the MiFID II definition, the UCITS definition
is also referenced in other EU legislative acts ( e.g. in the Money
Market Funds Regulation).106 The UCITS Directive essentially
considers all shares, securitized debt instruments, and “other
negotiable securities that carry the right to acquire any such trans-
ferable securities by subscription or exchange ” to be transferable
securities.107 At first sight, the content of the UCITS Directive
definition may appear to resemble the examples of transfer-
able securities mentioned in the MiFID II definition. However,
the UCITS definition differs from the MiFID II definition in that
the mentioned components of the transferable securities no-
tion form an exhaustive list, whereas the mentioned financial
assets in MiFID II are mere examples of transferable securi-
ties.108 Furthermore, in order to qualify as transferable secu-
rities under the UCITS regime, financial assets have to meet a
more detailed set of liquidity and negotiability standards.109 of ‘transferable securities’. 
04 MiFID II does not define ‘instruments of payment’, the 
European Commission has advanced a functional inter- 
pretation: “securities which are used only for the purposes of 
payment and not for investment.” See European Commis- 
sion, ‘Q&As on MiFID’, 1, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/ 
markets- financial- instruments- mifid- directive- 2004- 39- ec/ 
implementation/guidance- implementation- and- interpretation- law _ 
en . The instruments of payment notion typically includes e.g. 
checks and bills of exchanges. The purpose for which an asset 
was developed is non-determinative in this context, as it is the 
actual usage that determines the qualification as instrument of 
payment. It can be seen from the VAT-judgment of the ECJ on 
Bitcoin that this distinction is relevant (Case C–264/14 Skatteverket 
v David Hedqvist [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:718, para 52). According 
to the Court of Justice, Bitcoin is only intended to be used as 
a means of payment. However, as explained by Houben, it is 
unlikely that this tax decision can be easily transposed to the 
financial law context. See Robby Houben, ‘Bitcoins zijn deviezen 
voor btw-doeleinden, maar één zwaluw maakt de lente niet’ 
(2016) TBH-RDC 177. 
05 Art. 2(1)(n) and (7) Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Par- 
liament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to under- 
takings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) 
(recast) (text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 302, 17 November 2009, p. 32 
(UCITS Directive). 
06 See art. 2(3) Regulation (EU) 2017/1131 of the European Parlia- 
ment and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on money market funds 
(text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 169, 30 June 2017, p. 8. 
07 Art. 2(1)(n) and (7) UCITS Directive. 
08 The definition in the UCITS Directive arguably also only cap- 
tures a smaller set of derivative products. 
09 See art. 2 Commission Directive 2007/16/EC of 19 March 2007 
implementing Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the coordination of 
14 computer law & security review 40 (2021) 105494 
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n any case, all financial assets mentioned in the transferable 
ecurities definition of the UCITS Directive entail a certain li- 
bility of an entity vis-à-vis the asset holder. Since the list of 
nancial assets mentioned in the UCITS Directive definition 
as an exhaustive nature, this is sufficient prove of the fact 
hat the UCITS Directive transferable securities notion does 
ot capture assets that do not entail an entity’s liability. A for- 
iori , the relevant level 2 legislation classifies the UCITS Direc- 
ive transferable securities as financial instruments .110 
US securities law: Contrary to European financial law, the US 
ecurities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
rovide a definition for the ‘security’ notion.111 Naturally, the 
S securities notion cannot be transposed to the European 
ontext and, hence, I will only touch upon it briefly.112 Nev- 
rtheless, it is informative to make a brief detour to US law 
ince an expansive interpretation of the US statutes has ren- 
ered it possible to bring assets that do not entail the liability 
f an entity under the US securities notion. Indeed, whereas 
he statutory definition appears to limit the US securities con- 
ept to financial assets that entail the liability of an entity,113 
he US Supreme Court has extended the scope of the secu- 
ities notion beyond assets that merely entail the liability of aws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to under- 
akings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) 
s regards the clarification of certain definitions (text with EEA 
elevancy), OJ L 79, 20 March 2007, p. 11 (Commission Directive 
007/16/EC). Art. 2 Commission Directive 2007/16/EC still refers to 
he no longer existing art. 1(8) Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 
ecember 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and ad- 
inistrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective in- 
estment in transferable securities (UCITS), OJ L 375, 31 December 
985, p. 3 (Council Directive 85/611/EEC). The provision is neverthe- 
ess relevant for the interpretation of the definition of transferable 
ecurities contained in the UCITS Directive. That is to say, all refer- 
nces to Directive 85/611/EEC have to be read as references to the 
CITS Directive (see art. 117 UCITS Directive). Based on the corre- 
ation table, this implies that the interpretation in art. 2 Directive 
007/16/EC remains relevant for the interpretation of art. 2(1)(n) 
CITS Directive (see Annex IV to the UCITS Directive). 
10 Art. 2(1) Commission Directive 2007/16/EC. 
11 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 74 
1933), 15 USC § 77b(a)(1); Securities Exchange Act § 3, Pub. L. No. 
3-291, 404 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 USC § 78c(a)(10). 
12 See in the context of non-traditional assets more in detail 
.g. Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology from 
he SEC, ‘Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digi- 
al Assets’ (April 2019), available via https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/ 
ramework- investment- contract- analysis- digital- assets . 
13 See e.g. the definition in the Securities Act of 1933: “The term 
security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security- 
ased swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of in- 
erest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
ertificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, 
nvestment contract , voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a se- 
urity, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
ny put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of 
eposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or 
ased on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or priv- 
lege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign 
urrency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as 
 "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
r interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
ubscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. [own emphasis]”
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n entity. This has occurred through a broad interpretation of 
he catch-all notion ‘investment contract’, which is one of the 
ecurities types mentioned in the statutory definition.114 The 
ongstanding Howey -test from the US Supreme Court deter- 
ines that under US securities law a transaction or scheme 
as to meet the following conditions in order to qualify as an 
nvestment contract (and thus security): (i) a person invests 
is money; (ii) in a common enterprise; (iii) and is led to ex-
ect profits; (iv) solely from the efforts of the promoter or a 
hird party.115 Whereas the first two conditions are almost al- 
ays deemed to be satisfied, the SEC has traditionally focused 
n the assessment of the last two conditions.116 Since a rea- 
onable expectation of profits derived from efforts of others 
oes not imply that the considered asset entails the liability of 
n entity, the US securities notion does not necessarily require 
hat an asset entails the liability of an entity. In this respect,
S law fundamentally differs from EU law, which works with 
he umbrella notion of financial instruments ( supra ). 
.2.4. Other types of financial instruments 
s mentioned above, in addition to transferable securities, the 
ist of financial instruments in MiFID II includes money mar- 
et instruments, units in collective investment undertakings,
ertain derivatives, and certain emission allowances. To my 
nderstanding, these assets all entail the liability of an en- 
ity vis-à-vis the holder of the asset. Money market instru- 
ents, for instance, are defined as " those classes of instruments 
hich are normally dealt in on the money market, such as trea- 
ury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial papers and exclud- 
ng instruments of payment ".117 Just as with transferable secu- 14 See supra footnote 113. 
15 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., et al., 328 U.S. 293 (US Supreme Court 
946), at 298-299. 
16 Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology from 
he SEC, ‘Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digi- 
al Assets’ (April 2019), available via https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/ 
ramework- investment- contract- analysis- digital- assets . 
17 Art. 4(1)(17) MiFID II. This MiFID-definition imposes less restric- 
ive conditions than the definitions provided in certain other EU 
egislative acts. See, for instance, the definition of money market 
nstruments in art. 2(1)(o) Directive 2009/65/EC of the European 
arliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordina- 
ion of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
ndertakings for collective investment in transferable securities 
UCITS) (recast) (text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 302, 17 November 
009, p. 32 (Directive 2009/65/EC): “instruments normally dealt in on 
he money market which are liquid and have a value which can be ac- 
urately determined at any time ”. The phrase " instruments normally 
ealt in on the money market " is further clarified in art. 3 Commis- 
ion Directive 2007/16/EC of 19 March 2007 implementing Council 
irective 85/611/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
dministrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective 
nvestment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards the clari- 
cation of certain definitions (text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 79, 20 
arch 2007, p. 11 (Directive 2007/16/EC). In particular, this article 
rovides that any reference to " instruments normally dealt in on the 
oney market " must be understood as a reference to: (a) financial 
nstruments admitted to or dealt in on a regulated market in ac- 
ordance with art. 19(1)(a), (b), and (c) Council Directive 85/611/EEC 
f 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
dministrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective 
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rities, the listed examples do not limit the scope of the con-
cept and the relevant market ( i.e. money market) has not been
defined.118 However, as with transferable securities, the term
‘instruments’ seems to mean that assets that do not entail
the liability of an entity vis-à-vis the asset holder fall beyond
the scope of the concept. The other mentioned instruments
equally appear to refer to the representation of the liabil-
ity of an entity. A unit in a collective investment undertak-
ing, for example, entails a well-defined liability of the collec-
tive investment undertaking towards the investor holding the
unit. Similarly, a derivative contract entails a contingent lia-
bility of the counterparty to the contract, which may or may
not accumulate value over time, depending on the fluctua-
tion of the parameter underlying the contract. Finally, emis-
sion allowances entail the transferable right to emit one met-
ric tonne of carbon dioxide (or an amount of another green-
house gas with an equivalent global-warming capacity) during
a specified period, which is mirrored by the liability of the gov-
ernment to not penalize a polluter holding sufficient emission
allowances.119 investment in transferable securities (UCITS), OJ L 375, 31 Decem- 
ber 1985, p. 3 (Directive 85/611/EEC); and (b) financial instruments 
which are not admitted to trading. Although the wording of art. 3 
Directive 2007/16/EC only appears relevant for the interpretation 
of the no longer existing art. 1(9) Directive 85/611/EEC, the provi- 
sion is nevertheless relevant for the interpretation of the definition 
of money market instruments contained in art. 2(1)(o) Directive 
2009/65/EC. Indeed, all references to Directive 85/611/EEC must be 
read as references to Directive 2009/65/EC (see art. 117 Directive 
2009/65/EC). Based on the correlation table, this implies that the 
interpretation in art. 3 Directive 2007/16/EC of the notion “instru- 
ments normally dealt in on the money market ” from art. 1(9) Directive 
85/611/EEC remains relevant for the interpretation of art. 2(1)(o) 
Directive 2009/65/EC (see art. 117 in conjunction with Annex IV 
Directive 2009/65/EC). See in this context also art. 2(2) Regulation 
(EU) 2017/1131 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 June 2017 on money market funds (text with EEA relevancy), OJ 
L 169, 30 June 2017, p. 8. 
18 Cf. supra footnote 117 for guidance on the concept in other 
EU legislative documents. The money market is typically dis- 
tinguished from the capital market on the basis of the (re- 
maining) maturity of the traded instruments ( e.g. remaining 
maturity of one year). Conceptually, the MiFID II definition of 
money market instruments leaves the reader with little com- 
fort. In fact, the circular text of the Directive merely states 
that money market instruments are instruments that are 
traded on the money market. The European Commission is 
more pragmatic and has asserted that money market instru- 
ments are tradable liquid debt instruments. See European 
Commission, ‘Q&As on MiFID’, 41, https://ec.europa.eu/info/ 
law/markets- financial- instruments- mifid- directive- 2004- 39- ec/ 
implementation/guidance- implementation- and- interpretation- law _ 
en . 
19 Art. 3(a), (b), and (j) Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Par- 
liament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a sys- 
tem for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (text with EEA 
relevancy), OJ L 275 25 October 2003, p. 32. See also art. 16 of the 
Directive mentioned in this footnote. 
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3.3. Intermediate conclusion 
The preceding paragraphs have tentatively explored whether
there exists a common conceptual denominator that is shared
by all financial assets that are subject to EU financial legisla-
tion. I find that the financial assets subject to EU financial leg-
islation all entail the liability of an entity. Different from the
situation in the US, it would be unprecedented to interpret the
current scope of application of major EU financial legislation
as including assets that do not entail the liability of an entity.
Moreover, such reading would be exceedingly hard to recon-
cile with the notion of financial instruments . Since all assets
that entail the liability of an entity have intrinsic value, EU fi-
nancial law does not govern assets that only have extrinsic
value. It follows from this observation that inter alia Bitcoin,
Ether, Ripple, Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin SV, EOS, Litecoin, Binance
Coin, and Tez are currently not subject to EU financial legisla-
tion.120 
The results presented in this paper are in line with the gen-
eral findings of the European Commission and the EU reg-
ulatory agencies that many non-traditional financial assets
fall beyond the scope of EU financial legislation and, accord-
ingly, are not subject to inter alia EU rules on consumer or
investor protection and market integrity.121 Nevertheless, as
rightly pointed out by the European Commission in a recent
consultation document, the absence of a consensus on the ex-
act conditions under which novel asset types may qualify as
financial instruments in the sense of MiFID II, may create le-
gal uncertainty for market participants.122 In my view and as
illustrated by the analysis of the EU financial asset definitions
in the previous sections, this legal uncertainty originates to a
large extent from the circularity of EU financial asset defini-
tions. By aiming to identify the common conceptual denom-
inator of the financial instruments notion, this paper seeks
to provide a conceptual rationale for the findings of the EU20 Cf. supra no. 2.3.1, where it was argued that these assets do not 
entail the liability of an entity and have no intrinsic value. 
21 European Commission, ‘Consultation document on an 
EU framework for markets in crypto-assets’ (December 
2019) 4, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ 
business _ economy _ euro/banking _ and _ finance/documents/ 
2019- crypto- assets- consultation- document _ en.pdf. Cf . ESMA, 
‘Advice: Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets’ (9 Jan- 
uary 2019), available via https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/ 
default/files/library/esma50- 157- 1391 _ crypto _ advice.pdf; EBA, 
‘Report with advice for the European Commission on crypto- 
assets’ (9 January 2019), available via https://eba.europa.eu/ 
documents/10180/2545547/EBA+Report+on+crypto+assets.pdf; 
FCA, ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets: Feedback and Final Guid- 
ance to CP 19/3’ (Policy Statement PS19/22, July 2019), available 
via https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/ 
ps19- 22- guidance- cryptoassets . 
22 European Commission, ‘Consultation document on an EU 
framework for markets in crypto-assets’ (December 2019) 
7-8, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ 
business _ economy _ euro/banking _ and _ finance/documents/ 
2019- crypto- assets- consultation- document _ en.pdf. 
16 computer law & security review 40 (2021) 105494 
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egulatory agencies that most non-traditional assets are not 
ubject to contemporary EU law. 
.4. Policy implications 
n recent years, national, international, and supranational reg- 
lators and supervisors have paid close attention to the pro- 
iferation and rapid evolution of the different types of non- 
raditional financial assets.123 Although no consensus exists,
any policymakers appear to be convinced that the risks re- 
ated to many of the emerging non-traditional assets warrant 
he subjection of these assets to (financial) regulation.124 This 
as e.g. illustrated by policymakers’ responses to the 2019 
nnouncement that plans existed for conceiving the above- 
iscussed Libra system (see more in detail on Libra supra no.
.1).125 
This paper does not seek to address the desirability of 
egislation or regulation in the emerging markets for non- 
raditional assets or how such regulation, if any, should look 
ike. However, the intermediate conclusion discussed above 
 supra no. 3.3), appears highly relevant to this policy debate.
hat is to say, if the thesis defended in this paper is indeed 
orrect, this would mean that most non-traditional financial 
ssets fall beyond the scope of application of major EU finan- 23 Cf. e.g. Sharon Brown-Hruska and Trevor Wagener, ‘The virtual 
urrency regulatory framework in global context’ (2018) 13 CMLJ 
87-517. 
24 See e.g. FCA, ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets’ (Consultation Paper 
P19/3, January 2019) 11 et seq., available via https://www.fca.org. 
k/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf
25 See e.g. Tom Wilson, ‘Bitcoin tumbles as U.S. senators 
rill Facebook on crypto plans’ (Reuters, 16 July 2019), avail- 
ble via https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto-currencies/ 
itcoin- tumbles- as- u- s- senators- grill- facebook- on- crypto- plans- 
dUSKCN1UB24T?feedType=nl&feedName=businessNews&utm _ 
ource=Sailthru&utm _ medium=email&utm _ campaign=2018% 
0Template:%20US%20Business%20News%201700%207/1/19% 
0- %207/31/19%202019- 07- 16&utm _ term=2018%20- %20US% 
0Business%201700 ; Pete Schroeder and Katie Paul, ‘Face- 
ook should not be trusted with ’crazy’ cryptocurrency 
lan: senators’ (Reuters, 16 July 2019), available via https: 
/www.reuters.com/article/us- facebook- cryptocurrency- senate/ 
acebook- should- not- be- trusted- with- crazy- cryptocurrency- 
lan- senators- idUSKCN1UB174?feedType=nl&feedName= 
usinessNews&utm _ source=Sailthru&utm _ medium= 
mail&utm _ campaign=2018%20Template:%20US% 
0Business%20News%201700%207/1/19%20-%207/31/19% 
02019- 07- 16&utm _ term=2018%20- %20US%20Business% 
01700 ; Huw Jones, ‘Facebook’s Libra coin closely 
atched by authorities: FSB’ (Reuters, 25 June 2019), 
vailable via https://www.reuters.com/article/us- g20- fsb/ 
acebooks- libra- coin- closely- watched- by- authorities- fsb- 
dUSKCN1TQ1Z5 ; Huw Jones, David Milliken, Brenna Hughes 
eghaiwi, ‘European watchdogs demand detail on Face- 
ook’s cryptocurrency’ (Reuters, 25 June 2019), available 
ia https://www.reuters.com/article/us- facebook- crypto/ 
uropean-watchdogs-demand-detail-on-facebooks- 
ryptocurrency-idUSKCN1TQ0YR . See, however, also: Ques- 
ion for written answer Z-000040/2019 to the European Central 
ank, Eva Kaili, available via http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
oceo/document/ECON- QZ- 639928 _ EN.pdf. 
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ial legislation. Hence, if policymakers indeed find it necessary 
r appropriate to mitigate the risks related to non-traditional 
nancial assets, legislative or regulatory intervention will be 
equired. Against this backdrop, the European Commission is 
urrently examining whether a common regulatory approach 
t the EU level could be appropriate inter alia in the fields of
onsumer or investor protection and market integrity.126 In 
ny case, the large majority of the stakeholders consulted by 
he European Commission appear to agree that the absence of 
 common approach with regard to the qualification of non- 
raditional assets as financial instruments may constitute an 
mpediment to the further development of non-traditional fi- 
ancial assets and their markets.127 
Although the proposition defended in this paper points 
oward legislative or regulatory intervention if policymakers 
eem such intervention appropriate, it does not allow to deter- 
ine whether such intervention would be efficient. This pa- 
er essentially submits that EU financial legislation does not 
over assets with only extrinsic value, including most novel 
ypes of financial assets, since these assets cannot entail the 
iability of an entity. This exclusion from EU financial legisla- 
ion is based upon conceptual considerations, but from a more 
ractical perspective it would arguably also be hard, if not im- 
ossible, to apply many of the EU legislative acts to assets that 
o not entail the liability of an entity. More specifically, the ap- 
lication of many rules in EU financial legislation presume the 
xistence of a bilateral relationship between parties, which 
reates rights and liabilities. It is, for example, unclear how 
he prospectus regime could be applied to assets that have 
o identifiable issuer. Nevertheless, there appear to be good 
easons to worry e.g. about investor or consumer protection 
nd market integrity in the markets for non-traditional finan- 
ial assets. Hence, (tailor-made) legislation and regulation that 
oes not depend on the rights and liabilities that an asset may 
ntail vis-à-vis another party appears the most appropriate 
enue of future legislative or regulatory intervention. 
. Legal conceptions of money 
his paper has argued that EU financial law only governs as- 
ets that entail the liability of an entity. Against this backdrop,
his paper has drawn a distinction between assets that have 
ntrinsic value and assets that only have extrinsic value. In 
his section, I examine whether such distinction may also be 
seful for the monetary analysis of newly emerging financial 
ssets. 
26 European Commission, ‘Consultation document on an EU 
ramework for markets in crypto-assets’ (December 2019) 
-5, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ 
usiness _ economy _ euro/banking _ and _ finance/documents/ 
019- crypto- assets- consultation- document _ en.pdf. 
27 See the responses to question 59 of the European Com- 
ission consultation mentioned in footnote 126: https://ec. 
uropa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have- your- say/initiatives/ 
2089-Directive-regulation-establishing-a-European-framework- 
or- markets- in- crypto- assets/public- consultation . 
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Unless otherwise stipulated by law or agreement, euro
notes and coins are the only legal tender in the Eurozone.128
Consequently, a debtor can in principle not force his creditor
to accept a payment method other than a cash payment. This
principle also applies to payments that are executed through
any type of non-traditional asset: a debtor cannot force his
creditor to accept e.g. Bitcoin, Ether, or Tether, regardless of
whether these assets entail the liability of an entity or not. 
However, there exist theories that advocate broader legal
conceptualizations of money. Rather than based on legislative
acts, these theories are often inspired by asset properties and
functionalities that the respective authors deem necessary to
speak of money. In the following paragraphs, I briefly sketch
the central ideas that underlie the different money theories
and their relationship to novel forms of assets.129 In any case,
the legal conceptions of money do not necessarily correspond
to the meaning of the word ‘money’ in everyday language or
economic jargon.130 
4.1. Legal theories of money 
4.1.1. The state theory 
One strand in legal scholarship essentially argues that only
the items that are accepted as payment by the state consti-
tute money.131 Although M ann’s renowned book ( Mann on the
Legal Aspect of Money ) 132 is often cited as the main advocate
of the state theory of money, M ann’s money concept is lim-
ited to legal tender issued by the state.133 In the actual state
theory of money, the notion of money is only limited by the re-
quirement that the state must accept the relevant medium as
payment,134 which means that the money must not necessar-
ily be issued by the state. In any case, regardless of intrinsic or
extrinsic asset value, newly developed assets do not qualify as
money in either interpretation of the state theory of money.135
However, future innovative public policy may bring some of
these assets within the scope of the state theory of money. In28 Art. 128 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012, p. 47. 
29 See for a more comprehensive overview of the different the- 
ories of money e.g. Niels Vandezande, Virtual Currencies: A Legal 
Framework (Intersentia 2018) 141-154; Charles Proctor, Mann on the 
Legal Aspect of Money (Oxford University Press 2012) 15-30. 
30 In order to be able to speak of money in economic terms, it is 
traditionally required that the relevant medium (i) is a generally 
accepted means of exchange; (ii) preserves purchase power; and 
(iii) acts as a unit of account. 
31 Georg Friedrich Knapp, The State Theory of Money (Macmillan 
1924) 24. 
32 Initially, Mann’s standard work was known under a different 
title. See, for example, the 1982 version of the book: Frederick 
Alexander Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money (Oxford University Press 
1982). However, in the more recent versions that were published 
after Mann’s death in 1991, the surname of the book’s intellectual 
father has been included in the title: Charles Proctor, Mann on the 
Legal Aspect of Money (Oxford University Press 2012). 
33 See Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 15. 
34 Georg Friedrich Knapp, The State Theory of Money (Macmillan 
1924) 24. 
35 Cf . Niels Vandezande, Virtual Currencies: A Legal Framework (In- 
tersentia 2018) 144-146. 
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recent years, for instance, central banks have increasingly ex-
amined the potency of so-called digital currencies as a new
form of digital central bank money (see supra footnote 30). 
4.1.2. The societal theory 
The societal theory of money rejects the notion that the ac-
tions of the state determine what can be regarded as money.
Instead, it posits that the social consensus defines what
should legally be regarded as money.136 Hence, the public ac-
ceptance and use of a certain item as a means of payment
determines that item’s legal status as money within a soci-
ety.137 Although one may argue that it would be desirable to
let the societal consensus determine what constitutes money,
there appears to be no legal basis for this theory.138 A social
consensus criterion also seems hard to work with from a le-
gal point of view, as there exist no well-defined parameters to
decide on the degree of social consensus that would have to
be reached.139 I am tempted to think that there is currently no
social consensus on the acceptance of any of the newly devel-
oped assets as money,140 but, as stated, objective parameters
are absent. Hence, one could very well argue the opposite. In
any case, just as the state theory of money, the societal theory
of money functions independently from the asset categoriza-
tion that I have suggested in this paper. 
4.1.3. The institutional theory 
The institutional theory of money argues that money is no
more than a specific sort of claim against a debtor, whose pub-
lic acceptance as a means of payment and purchase power
preservation depends on the presence of a legal framework
that, among other things, aims to guarantee the value of the
claim.141 This theory is closely linked to the conventional and
unconventional powers of central banks to conduct mone-
tary policy and implies that the money supply has to be con-
trolled by the central bank.142 Through money creation, a cen-
tral bank can control the money base, and if it properly ac-36 Arthur Nussbaum, Money in the Law: National and International. A 
Comparative Study in the Borderline of Law and Economics (Foundation 
Press 1950) 8. 
37 Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (Oxford Uni- 
versity Press 2012) 23-24. 
38 In this respect the societal theory of money differs from the 
state theory of money, which has a constitutional basis in many ju- 
risdictions. Cf . Rosa Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law 
(Oxford University Press 2015) 15-16. 
39 Similarly, it is unclear what network of users could be deemed 
to amount to a ‘society’. 
40 See for example otherwise: US District Court Eastern District 
of Texas 6 August 2013, SEC v. Trendon T. Shavers and Bitcoin Sav- 
ings and Trust , Case no. 4:13-CV-416, where the mere possibility to 
use Bitcoin as money and exchange it for conventional currencies 
was deemed sufficient to qualify Bitcion as a currency or form of 
money. See more in detail on this decision: Niels Vandezande, Vir- 
tual Currencies: A Legal Framework (Intersentia 2018) 152. 
41 Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, ‘An Institutional Theory of Money’ in 
Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (eds), International Monetary and 
Financial Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 517, 517. 
42 Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, ‘An Institutional Theory of Money’ in 
Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (eds), International Monetary and 
Financial Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 517, 525. Although cen- 
tral banks are now typically public institutions, in the institutional 
theory of money – unlike in the state theory of money – they could 
18 computer law & security review 40 (2021) 105494 
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s
ounts for ‘private money creation’ by commercial banks,143 
he central bank will also have control over the money supply 
 i.e. the total amount of ‘money’ available in the economy).144 
n other words, in the institutional theory of money, the le- 
al foundations of the institutional framework ensure that a 
ertain type of claim can be regarded as money. 
According to the institutional theory of money, money con- 
ists of claims on issuing central banks and claims on com- 
ercial banks (the latter in the form of deposits that are held 
y the public and are repayable on demand).145 This type of 
laims on commercial banks is seen as an indirect claim on 
he issuing central bank since the claim can be converted at 
ny time into banknotes, which are a direct claim on the cen- 
ral bank.146 In the Eurozone, the following items would qual- 
fy as money under the institutional theory of money. First,
ll euro banknotes issued by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
r Eurozone national central banks are legally and technically 
 claim on a central bank,147 which constitutes money. Sec- 
ndly, a credited deposit account held by a commercial bank 
ith the central bank also creates a claim on the central bank 
hat qualifies as money.148 Finally, as explained above, the 
laims of depositors against their commercial banks equally 
ualify as money in the institutional theory of money. At the 
ime of writing, none of the novel types of assets can be cat- 
gorized as money under the institutional theory of money.
owever, according to the institutional theory of money, only 
ssets that entail the liability of an entity can qualify as 
oney. Assets with only extrinsic value can never qualify as 
oney. 
.1.4. The credit theory 
imilar to the institutional theory of money, the credit theory 
f money—founded by I nnes—views money as a claim on an lso be private institutions. See Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, ibid , 531- 
32. 
43 I.e. if the central bank takes into account the monetary trans- 
ission mechanisms through which ‘private’ money is created 
ithin commercial banks. 
44 See, for example, Freddy Heylen, Macro-economie (Garant 2014) 
92. Traditionally, the money supply refers to all currency in cir- 
ulation and various kinds of deposits held by the public at com- 
ercial banks. See Freddy Heylen, ibid , 290. 
45 Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (Oxford Uni- 
ersity Press 2012) 27; Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, ‘An Institutional 
heory of Money’ in Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (eds), Inter- 
ational Monetary and Financial Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 
17, 523. 
46 Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, ‘An Institutional Theory of Money’ in 
ario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (eds), International Monetary and 
inancial Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 517, 523. 
47 Art. 3(3) Decision of the European Central Bank of 13 Decem- 
er 2010 on the issue of euro banknotes (recast) (ECB/2010/29) 
2011/67/EU), OJ L 9 February 2011, p. 35, 26. Both the ECB and the 
urozone national central banks are entitled to issue euro ban- 
notes (see art. 2 of the aforementioned Decision). Typically, these 
laims on the central bank do not have a maturity, nor are they 
ver payable. Cf. Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, ‘An Institutional Theory 
f Money’ in Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (eds), International 
onetary and Financial Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 517, 523. 
48 Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, ‘An Institutional Theory of Money’ in 
ario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (eds), International Monetary and 
inancial Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 517, 523. 
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ntity or a “token of indebtedness ”.149 However, unlike the in- 
titutional theory of money, the credit theory of money does 
ot require money to be a debt instrument issued by a pub- 
ic institution. Innes does not impose any ‘additional’ criteria 
o the issued debt instrument: “Mone y […] is credit and noth- 
ng but credit. A’s money is B’s debt to him, and when B pays his
ebt, A’s money disappears. This is the whole theory of money .”150 
ence, a debt instrument issued by a private actor may just 
s well be regarded as money, as long as “the giver acknowl- 
dges his obligation to take [the token of indebtedness] back in 
ayment of a debt due ”.151 By regarding the issuance of a debt 
nstrument pivotal to the money concept, the credit theory of 
oney aims to reject the notion that coins derive their value 
rom the precious metals that may be linked to them, as was 
.g. the case with the gold standard.152 Nowadays this notion 
ay seem self-evident, but until the beginning of the twenti- 
th century this was by no means a generally accepted point 
f view. According to the credit theory of money, money is- 
ued by the government creates a debt of the issuing govern- 
ent vis-à-vis the entity holding the money. More specifically,
oney issuance by the government implies the government’s 
bligation to accept the issued money as payment for the sat- 
sfaction of any due debt towards the government ( e.g. taxes 
hat are due).153 Under the credit theory of money, novel as- 
et types that entail the liability of an entity would qualify as 
oney. On the contrary, assets that have only extrinsic asset 
alue, such as Bitcoin, cannot qualify as money in the credit 
heory of money.154 
.2. Electronic money 
he Second Electronic Money Directive requires EU member 
tates to prohibit natural or legal persons who have not been 
uthorized as electronic money issuers from issuing elec- 
ronic money (e-money).155 Electronic money is defined as any 
lectronically stored monetary value that (i) is represented by 
 claim on the issuer; (ii) has been issued in exchange of funds
or the purpose of making payment transactions ; 156 and (iii) is 49 Alfred Mitchell Innes, ‘What is Money?’ (1913) 30 Banking LJ 
77, 402. See for an authoritative review of this paper: John May- 
ard Keynes, ‘What is Money? By Mitchell Innes’ (1914) 24 EJ, 419. 
50 Alfred Mitchell Innes, ‘What is Money?’ (1913) 30 Banking LJ 
77, 402. 
51 Alfred Mitchell Innes, ‘What is Money?’ (1913) 30 Banking LJ 
77, 402. 
52 Alfred Mitchell Innes, ‘What is Money?’ (1913) 30 Banking LJ 
77, 379. 
53 Alfred Mitchell Innes, ‘What is Money?’ (1913) 30 Banking LJ 
77, 402. 
54 Contra Niels Vandezande, Virtual Currencies: A Legal Framework 
Intersentia 2018) 157. 
55 Art. 10 Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and 
f the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and 
rudential supervision of the business of electronic money insti- 
utions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and re- 
ealing Directive 2000/46/EC (text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 267 10 
ctober 2009, p. 7 (hereinafter: Second Electronic Money Directive). 
56 For the definition of the term ‘payment transactions’, the Sec- 
nd Electronic Money Directive still refers Directive 2007/64/EC 
f the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 
007 on payment services in the internal market amending Di- 
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accepted by entities other than the electronic money issuer.157 
Hence, the categorization suggested in this paper based on as-
set value is also valuable in this context. Novel assets that
have only extrinsic value, such as Bitcoin and Litecoin, can
never qualify as electronic money because they do not rep-
resent the liability of an issuer.158 Consequently, all rules that
are connected to the concept of electronic money cannot be
applied to this type of assets.159 On the other hand, assets that
represent the liability of an entity ( e.g. Libra) may be covered
if all conditions from the electronic money definition are met.
If this is the case, the relevant entity will have to obtain an
authorization as electronic money institution to carry out ac-
tivities involving electronic money.160 
4.3. Payment services 
In principle, the Second Payment Services Directive (PSD II) re-
quires EU member states to bar EU undertakings from provid-
ing payment services, unless they have obtained authoriza-
tion as a payment institution prior to the commencement of
the provision of payment services.161 The notion payment ser-
vices refers to (i) [s] ervices enabling cash to be placed on a pay-
ment account as well as all the operations required for operating a
payment account ; (ii) [s] ervices enabling cash withdrawals from a
payment account as well as all the operations required for operating
a payment account ; (iii) [e] xecution of payment transactions, includ-
ing transfers of funds on a payment account with the user’s payment
service provider or with another payment service provider ; 162 (iv)
[e] xecution of payment transactions where the funds are covered byrectives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and re- 
pealing Directive 97/5/EC (text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 319, 5 De- 
cember 2007, p. 1. This directive has been replaced by Directive 
(EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, 
amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC 
(text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 337, 23 December 2015, p. 35. Art. 4(5) 
of this directive defines a payment transaction as “an act, initiated 
by the payer or on his behalf or by the payee, of placing, transferring or 
withdrawing funds, irrespective of any underlying obligations between 
the payer and the payee ”. 
57 Art. 2(2) Second Electronic Money Directive. 
58 Cf . Robby Houben, ‘Bitcoin: there are two sides to every coin’ 
(2015) TBH-RDC 139, 157. 
59 Cf . EBA, ‘Report with advice for the European Commis- 
sion on crypto-assets’ (9 January 2019), 13-14, available via 
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2545547/EBA+Report+ 
on+crypto+assets.pdf. 
60 Cf . EBA, ‘Report with advice for the European Commis- 
sion on crypto-assets’ (9 January 2019), 14, available via 
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2545547/EBA+Report+ 
on+crypto+assets.pdf. 
61 Art. 11(1) Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in 
the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC 
and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing 
Directive 2007/64/EC (text with EEA relevancy), OJ L 337, 23 Decem- 
ber 2015, p. 35 (hereinafter: PSD II). 
62 In particular: “(a) execution of direct debits, including one-off direct 
debits; (b) execution of payment transactions through a payment card 
or a similar device; (c) execution of credit transfers, including standing 
orders.”
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a credit line for a payment service user ; 163 (v) [i] ssuing of payment
instruments and/or acquiring of payment transactions ; (vi) [m] oney
remittance ; (vii) [p] ayment initiation services ; and (viii) [a] ccount
information services ”.164 All components of this enumeration
refer indirectly to the defined notion of ‘funds’.165 In PSD II,
‘funds’ refers to banknotes, coins, scriptural money,166 or elec-
tronic money as defined in the Second Electronic Money Direc-
tive.167 In order to speak of funds in the meaning of PSD II, it
is thus required that the considered assets represent the li-
ability of an entity. Consequently, non-traditional assets that
have only extrinsic value, such as Bitcoin and Litecoin, can-
not qualify as funds in the sense of PSD II because they do
not represent the liability of an issuer. Assets that represent
the liability of an entity, on the other hand, may under certain
circumstances be covered by the funds and payment services
notions. 
5. Conclusion 
As a complement to the asset categorizations that are based
on the technologies or functionalities underpinning non-
traditional asset types, this paper has proposed a novel sys-
tematization of non-traditional assets that is based upon as-
set value. More specifically, this paper has submitted that, ir-
respective of underlying technologies and functionalities, all
assets that are subject to major EU financial legislation have
a conceptual common denominator: they entail the liability
of an entity and, hence, have intrinsic value. Narrative evi-
dence construed around the financial instrument notion from
MiFID has illustrated that EU financial law has historically
not encapsulated assets that do not entail an entity’s liabil-
ity within its scope of application. More fundamentally, the63 In particular: “(a) execution of direct debits, including one-off direct 
debits; (b) execution of payment transactions through a payment card 
or a similar device; (c) execution of credit transfers, including standing 
orders.”
64 Art. 4(3) juncto Annex I PSD II. 
65 The first two elements of the enumeration refer to the notion 
‘payment account’. Payment account in turn refers to the notion 
‘payment transaction’, which is “an act, initiated by the payer or 
on his behalf or by the payee, of placing, transferring or withdrawing 
funds , irrespective of any underlying obligations between the payer and 
the payee ([ added emphasis ]”. See art. 4(12) and (5) PSD II. The third 
and fourth component of the enumeration also refer to payment 
transactions. The fifth element in the enumeration refers to the 
acquisition of payment transactions and/or issuance of payment 
instruments. The latter concept refers to the initiation of payment 
orders, which in turn references payment transactions. See art. 
4(14) and (13) PSD II. Money remittances also refer to funds (see 
art. 4(22) PSD II). The last two elements of the enumeration ( i.e. 
payment initiation services and account information services) re- 
fer to the term ‘payment account’ and thus indirectly reference 
the funds notion. See art. 4(15) and (16) PSD II. 
66 Scriptural money refers to deposit balances held at a com- 
mercial or central bank, or electronic money. See ECB Crypto- 
Assets Task Force, ‘Crypto-Assets: Implications for financial sta- 
bility, monetary policy, and payments and market infrastruc- 
tures’ (ECB Occasional Paper Series no. 223, May 2019) 8 (foot- 
note 14), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ 
ecb.op223 ∼3ce14e986c.en.pdf. 
67 Art. 4(25) PSD II. 
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None. mbrella term for the financial assets within the scope of EU 
nancial legislation ( i.e. financial instruments ) reveals that EU 
nancial law exclusively governs the means or instruments 
hrough which the investment in an underlying investment 
bject is made possible. 
The systematization of non-traditional assets proposed in 
his paper is no panacea for interpretational issues in rela- 
ion to the financial assets within the scope of EU financial 
egislation. That is to say, the observation that a certain asset 
ntails the liability of an entity and thus has intrinsic value 
s insufficient to conclude that the asset is governed by EU fi- 
ancial law. However, the proposed categorization sheds light 
n a group of assets that are definitely not covered by EU fi- 
ancial law: assets that only have extrinsic value. From this 
erspective, the proposed categorization is complementary to 
xisting categorizations that focus on the functionalities of 
on-traditional assets. By employing an objective parameter,
he suggested categorization allows to eradicate ambiguities 
nd potential overinclusiveness of functionality-based cate- 
orizations of non-traditional assets. When applied to the ten 
on-traditional assets with the largest market capitalization 
s listed on CMC, I find that nine out of ten applications ( i.e.
ther, Ripple, Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin SV, EOS, Litecoin, Binance 
oin, and Tez) fall beyond the scope of EU financial legislation.nly one of the listed assets entails the liability of an entity 
nd may thus fall within the scope of EU financial legislation 
 i.e. Tether). In an analysis of the different legal conceptualiza- 
ions of money, the categorization proposed in this paper may 
rove relevant only under the institutional and credit theory 
f money. The state and societal theory of money function in- 
ependently from the asset categorization that has been sug- 
ested in this paper. 
This paper has not addressed the desirability of ade- 
uate investor protection in the emerging markets for non- 
raditional assets. However, this paper has aimed to show that 
t would be unprecedented to interpret the current scope of 
pplication of major EU financial legislation as including as- 
ets that do not entail the liability of an entity. Moreover, such 
eading would be exceedingly hard to reconcile with the no- 
ion of financial instruments . Hence, if the EU legislator deems 
t necessary to subject non-traditional assets that do not entail 
he liability of an entity to a legislative and regulatory frame- 
ork, legislative intervention is warranted. 
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